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Introduction

There are three essays in this research. The main objective of the research is to extend
the literature in corporate finance by investigating the quality of earnings around corporate
events like net share issues, put option sales by firms on their own stock, and hedging
commodities by high input cost group of firms.
The first paper is “Does Earnings Quality predicts Net Share Issuance”. This paper
investigates whether quality of earnings predicts net share issuance by corporations. Pontiff and
Woodgate (2008) show that annual share issuance (ISSUE) measure is a better predictor of
future cross-sectional returns and we use this to measure the if a firm is net issuer of equity or net
repurchasers. Market timing due to information asymmetry is one reason why manager issue
equity when they perceive that their firms are overvalued. We use earnings quality as a measure
of information asymmetry and found that the ISSUE (net equity issuance) has an inverse
relationship with quality of the earnings reported by the firms. First, firms with poor (good)
earnings quality have higher (lower) information asymmetry and tend to issue more (less) equity
and this finding was true for a variety of earnings quality measures used in the literature.
Second, firms with negative net issuance (net repurchasers) are more likely to have higher
quality of earnings; this is true across all the earnings quality proxies except for one. On the
contrary firms with positive net issuance (net issuers) were found to have lower quality of
earnings.
The second paper is “Put Option Sales and Earnings Quality: Evidence of Market
Timing”. This paper provides evidence that earnings quality is high for the sample of Put Option
Selling (POS) firms which are actively timing the market compared to a matching sample of
vi

firms.

We hypothesize that due to information asymmetry; managers of POS firms have

additional private information and estimate their stock was mispriced (undervalued) and thus
expect the stock price to increase in the near future, as a result they are less likely to manage
abnormal accruals and thus resulting in higher quality of earnings. We provide additional
evidence of market timing (mispricing due to undervaluation) using Residual Income Model
(RIM).
The third paper is “Earnings Quality: A case of Hedging Strategies by US Airlines”. This
paper investigates the quality of earnings in high input cost industries like transportation, coffee
which are similar to Airlines. We intend to extend this study to include more industries with
similar characteristics of input costs. At this stage the paper the research presents evidence on
the performance of firm and quality of earnings in a small sample of US airlines around a
specific regulation change. Historically jet fuel prices have fluctuated heavily, specifically over
the past few years which significantly affected the US Airlines ability to maintain consistent
positive cash flows. The companies used several hedging and abnormal hedging strategies to
navigate these volatile periods. We analyze these strategies employed by dichotomizing them
into pure hedge positions and abnormal hedging positions and calculate the effect around
implementing FASB #133 / IASB #39 on firm value among other variables in each case and
identify behaviors leading to these decisions. The main hypothesis is that firms which are
hedging have higher quality of earnings as compared to speculating firms.
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Chapter 1: Does Earnings Quality predict Net Share Issuance?

We investigate whether quality of earnings predicts net share issuance by corporations.
Pontiff and Woodgate, (2008) show that net share issuance (ISSUE) measure is a better predictor
of future cross-sectional returns and we use this to measure to calculate if a firm is net issuer of
equity or net repurchasers. Market timing due to information asymmetry is one of the reasons
why managers issue equity when they perceive that their firms are overvalued. We use earnings
quality as a measure of information asymmetry and find that the ISSUE (net equity issuance) has
an inverse relationship with quality of the earnings reported by the firms. First, firms with poor
(good) earnings quality have higher (lower) information asymmetry and tend to issue more (less)
equity and this finding is true for a variety of earnings quality measures used in the literature.
Second, firms with negative net issuance (net repurchasers) are more likely to have higher
quality of earnings; this is true across all the earnings quality proxies except for one. On the
contrary firms with positive net issuance (net issuers) were found to have lower quality of
earnings.

1.1

Introduction
Firms change their capital structure in a variety of ways. Most commonly, this is done

through security issuance (either debt or equity), share repurchases, stock-based mergers and
debt retirement. This research focuses on equity changes in general and leaves the debt changes
for future. In the case of equity issuance and stock-based mergers, there is a vast literature
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showing that the market reacts negatively to these events. On the other hand, share repurchases
are usually met with a positive market reaction.
Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) show that their net share issuance (ISSUE) measure is a
better predictor of the cross-sectional returns than existing measures like book-to-market, size,
and momentum in predicting cross-sectional returns. They hypothesized that this relation could
be driven by two factors, either in response to an asset pricing model or irrational mispricing in
the market Our paper focuses on the later possible source of the cross-sectional variation found
by Pontiff and Woodgate. If equity was mispriced, firms may attempt to ‘time’ the market, visà-vis their share issuance or repurchasing activities. Firms issue equity if they are overvalued
and buy equity when they are undervalued. As the mispricing is eventually arbitraged away, the
result is an inverse (direct) relation between issuance (repurchase) and return.
There is a growing body of literature that examines the effect of equity mispricing on
capital structure and individual share issuance activities like SEO, mergers, and repurchases.1
However, that work does not directly address the effect of such activity on the post issuance
cross-sectional returns. Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) show that the ISSUE measure based on
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) is a better predictor of future returns and at the same time
overcome the issues related to long-run studies. They also leave an open question regarding the
source of the relation between share issuance and subsequent cross-sectional returns, stating that
“although we do not address whether the source of this predictability is mispricing or a rational
response to an asset pricing model, it appears doubtful that these results can be explained solely
by a risk-based asset pricing model.”

1

Baker and Wurgler (2002), Graham and Harvey (2001), Elliott et al. (2007), Huang and Ritter (2005), Leary and
Roberts (2005), Hovakimian (2006)

2

This provides a unique opportunity to test the market timing due to information
asymmetry using earnings quality as a proxy.

We propose to measure the information

asymmetry of a firm using its earnings quality based on several measures used in the previous
literature. The most commonly used measures are based on the modified jones model and
Dechow and Dichev model, we use several variations of these models as robustness check.
These models provide a direct approach to assessing the information available to outside
investors than the more commonly used proxies. Our main hypothesis is that poor earnings
quality results in increase of equity share issuances as the managers try to take advantage of
overvaluation of the firms’ stock.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the prior literature and
develops the hypotheses, Section 3 describes the data and methodology, Section 4 describes the
analysis and presents the results, and Section 5 offers conclusions.

1.2

Literature and Hypothesis development

1.2.1 Corporate Financing activities and market timing
Firms can raise money using financing methods either when they really need the money
for the investments or at an opportunistic time by timing the market.

There has been an

extensive research done in finance regarding the effects of individual share issuance activities,
such as SEO’s, mergers based on stock, and stock repurchase announcements. One explanation
based on behavioral finance theory suggests that firms issue shares when they perceive that they
are overvalued and retire shares when undervalued. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and
Afflck-Graves (1995) show that long-run stock returns are negatively related to SEO’s while
3

there is a positive abnormal return before the SEO’s as shown by Ikenberry et al. (2000).
Laughran and Vijh (1997) show that long-run stock returns are negatively related for the stock
based acquirer in a merger. All the above research concludes that share issuance in many forms
is mainly motivated by mispricing (undervalue) and result in a negative returns in the future.
The other alternative for financing is wait until the need arise for investment and then try
to finance it by raising money. There are number of research studies which indicate that this
might be not be the best approach. Halka (1999), Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001),
Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) argue that the liquidity in the
market is not always available and thus the firm might face a bad market to raise money. Thus
market timing due to undervaluation or precautionary risk management lead to share issuance by
the firms.
The previous studies test only long-run return predictability of the individual share
issuance events. Firms in general make use of various financing activities at any given time. We
propose to use Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) annual share issuance measure which has a better
predictability of future stock returns cross-sectionally and at the same time overcome the issues
with the long-run studies like specification and inference issues as discussed by Mitchell and
Stafford (2000).
1.2.2 Aggregate share issue
The annual issuance measure ISSUE is based on Stephens and Weisbach (1998), this
measure is constructed using cross-section of the stocks. Daniel and Titman (2006) proposed a
similar measure, they use 5 years to aggregate the share issues. Pontiff and Woodgate (2008)
show that annual share issuance is a better predictor of stock returns than the existing measures
like B2M (book-to-market), size, and momentum. They also find that these result are significant
4

only post 1970 as the number of firms net annual share issuance has increased in that time
period. They predict that market timing by managers due to mispricing might explain the results
and did not rule out that asset pricing and as a cause. McLean (2011) using net share issuance
measure found that “firms increasingly issue shares for the purpose of cash savings” mainly as a
precautionary move when the issuance costs are lower.
This research contributes to the area of share issuance literature by extending the existing
literature that use aggregate share issue. Baker and Wurgler (2000), and Lowry (2003) studied
the trend in share issuance, and Dittmar and Dittmar (2008) show that share issuance activity is
high in expansion phase of business life cycle, McLean (2011) provides similar evidence that
biggest cash savings is in the period of expansions for the firm using share issuances.

We

propose that share issuance is a result of firms having poor earnings quality and thus the
aggregate issuance is a result of market timing by firm in the time of poor earnings quality.
1.2.3 Information Asymmetry and Earnings Quality
Accounting earnings is used widely to measure the performance of a firm, the quality of
this information is used as a proxy for information asymmetry between the mangers and the
outside investors. We use several measures based on discretionary accruals to measure earnings
quality, specifically we use modified jones model and newer Dechow and Dichev (2002) model
using operating cash flows to measure earnings quality.
There is a multitude of literature in accounting and finance in the area of earnings quality
and earnings management, looking at different financing activities of the firm and their
relationship to the corporate activities. Both determinants and the consequences are listed in by
DeChow et al. (2010) in their summary of literature in earnings quality area, most of these
studies examine if firms are interested in economic incentives and thus as a result manage their
5

earnings and at the same time the consequences of firms managing their earnings. All the
corporate financing and investing actives were reviewed and the proxies used in all the studies
were summarized.
Earnings quality has been used in the literature many times. Sloan (1996) show that
overvaluing of low earnings quality firms is corrected over time, Penman and Zhang (2002),
Dechow and Schrand (2004) and Melumand and Nissim (2009) show that earnings quality
predicts the future sustainable persistent earnings. The effect of earnings quality on financing
and investment activities like SEO (Rangan 1998), stock repurchases (Hribar et at. 2006); IPO,
Insider trading (Aboody et al. 2005), stock returns (Chan et al. 2001) and return volatility (Chen
et al. 2008) were extensively studied. This line of research consistently concludes that poor
earning quality leads to increase in financing activities and thus as a results a decrease in future
stock returns.
Earnings quality increases with the level of information asymmetry between the investors
and mangers. Trueman and Titman, (1988) conclude that the information asymmetry between
management and investors is required for managing earnings, because shareholders have less
information about firm’s performance and future prospects if they have less information than
management. In such case, management can use its accounting discretion to manage reported
earnings thus managing the quality of the earnings. In addition management’s discretionary
ability to manage earnings increases as the information asymmetry between management and
shareholders increases. Richardson (1998) provides empirical evidence consistent with Trueman
and Titman. He concludes that the quality of the earnings as measured by bid-ask spread and
analysts earnings forecast variance is directly related to the level of information asymmetry.
Lobo and Zhou (2001) find that disclosure are negatively related to earnings quality. Firms that

6

disclose less tend to engage more in earnings management and vice versa. As corporate
disclosure is negatively related to information asymmetry, this provides indirect evidence of the
relationship between information asymmetry and earnings quality. The information asymmetry
in the corporate financings activities creates an opportunity for management to engage in
earnings management thus reducing the quality of earnings.
Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) find that earnings management is related to the
underperformance of SEOs. “They find that the annual growth in issuers’ asset-scaled net
income significantly exceeds that of matched non-issuers”. Using quarterly data, Rangan (1998)
finds that “earnings management is most significant in the quarter in which the offering is
announced and in the following quarter”. Thus showing evidence that firms actively manage
earnings two quarters before.
Lee and Masulis (2009) propose to use accounting information quality measures to
measure the information asymmetry between mangers and outside investors. They show that
poor quality of the accounting information increases the overall floatation cost of SEO issues as
a result of larger underwriting costs.
Extending this line of research Biddle et al. (2006, 2009) show that higher earnings
quality increases the investment efficiency by reducing the externalities like moral hazard and
adverse selection which tend to reduce the investment efficiency.

They also study the

relationship between earnings quality and investment efficiency in a country level study and
conclude that higher earnings quality reduced information asymmetry between mangers and
investors and this result is pronounced when creditors are supplying capital.

7

1.2.4 Hypothesis
Initially we explore if earnings quality is related to net share issue, we posit that poor
earnings quality increases the asymmetric information between managers and investors. As
shown by Majluf (1984) and Krasker (1986) greater information asymmetry leads to managers
timing the market to exploit the overvaluation of the equity. Thus information asymmetry and
resulting managers propensity to time the market shows a positive relation between lower
earnings quality and net share issue. We define three main hypotheses as follows:

H1: Lower Earnings quality leads to increase in net shares issued (ISSUE)

Additionally we propose to divide the sample of net share issuers into “Net Issuers” who
are issuing equity in general and “Net Repurchasers” who are retiring or repurchasing the equity
in general. Prior literature Hribar et at., (2006) look at repurchases and conclude that firms use
repurchases in manage their EPS. Firm repurchase mostly when they perceive that their stock
price is undervalued. Firms issue stock when overvalued and repurchase stock when
undervalued, thus we divide our sample into two and define two additional hypotheses.

H2: Earnings quality is lower for net issuing firms where ISSUE > 0
H3: Earnings quality is higher for net repurchasing firms where ISSUE < 0

First we predict that “Net Issuers” have lower earnings quality and “Net Repurchasers”
have higher earnings quality, in both cases the manager of the firm will exploit the mispricing of
the stock caused by information asymmetry.

8

1.3

Data and Sample
In this section we describe in detail about the motivation, methodology, and construction

of all the variables used in this study, include earnings quality proxies, share issuance measures,
and control variables. We also discuss the sample construction and descriptive statistics of the
variables used in the study.
The earlier studies of earnings quality use discretionary accruals as a proxy for
information asymmetry. In a summary of literature documented by Dechow, Ge, and Schrand,
(2010) discretionary accruals was most used proxy in about 350 research papers. Accruals are
accounting entries used to adjust the operating cash flows when calculating the accounting
earnings of a firm, while discretionary accruals are the part of these accruals which are made
solely on the managers own discretion. While accounting earnings are the most used measure of
a firm’s performance, the discretionary nature of some accruals will induce measurement errors,
thus the quality of the accruals is used in the same context as earnings quality. Discretionary
accruals can both increase or decrease as they can be used by manger to hide poor performance
or use current earnings in future (DeFond and Park (1997). We use four measures of earnings
quality (EQ) based on Francis et al. (2005), and Aboody et al. (2005).
First two (EQ1 and EQ2) are based on Dechow et al. (1995), and Dechow, Sloan, and
Sweeney (1995), modified jones model. We calculate total accruals as the difference between
earnings and operating cash flows. The other two (EQ3 and EQ4) are based on Dechow and
Dichev, (2002) and use working capital accruals relationship with cash flows realizations. All
methods use accounting information and differentiate accruals into nondiscretionary (normal)
and discretionary (abnormal) parts. The absolute value of the discretionary accruals (abnormal)
is the measure of the earnings quality, the lower absolute value of this indicates higher earnings
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quality and vice versa. We follow Aboody et al. (2005) methodology to calculate all four of our
earnings quality measures.
We use two share issuance measures, one based on Pontiff and Woodgate, (2008), which
measures last year net share issue using CRSP data, we call it hence forth equity issuance
(ISSUE). The second equity issuance variable is DT_ISSUE which is based on Daniel and
Titman, (2006), which measure last five years net share issue using CRSP data. Additionally we
use a third measure as used by Fama and French (2008) which is similar to the two above but
adds an additional time frame of three years for net share issuance. This aggregate share issue
(ISSUE) captures all the new stock issues and retirement activities like secondary equity offering
(SEO), stock based mergers, and repurchases over the measure time interval.
1.3.1 Earnings quality proxies
We calculate all earnings quality proxy measure (EQ1, EQ2, EQ3, and EQ4) using data
from financial statements from Compustat starting from year 1970 to 2012.
1.3.1.1 EQ1 based on modified jones model
First we calculate the difference between earnings and operating cash flows as total
accruals (TA) for all firms j in time (year) t based on the following equation:

TAj,t = ( CAj,t − CLj,t − CASH j,t + STDEBTj,t − DEPNj,t )
Where:
CAj,t
CLj,t
CASHj,t
STDEBTj,t
DEPNj,t

= firm j’s change in current assets (Compustat #4) in year t,
= firm j’s change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) in year t,
= firm j’s change in cash (Compustat #1) in year t,
= firm j’s change in short-term debt (Compustat #34) in year t,
= firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat #14) in year t
10

We estimate normal accruals (NA) for each firm j in time t by using two steps; first we
perform industry level (minimum 20 firms) cross-sectional regression for 48 Fama and French’s,
(1997) industries using equation (1) for all firms in Compustat. Then we use the industry year
specific co-efficients from the regression to calculate firm specific normal accruals (NA) for
each firm scaling by lagged total assets as shown in equation (2). These normal accruals are the
nondiscretionary accruals which are part of the total accruals of the firms and mangers have no
discretion to change.

We use modified jones model and use revenues including accounts

receivables while estimating the cross-section regression but delete them while calculate the firm
level normal accruals.

Where:
REVj,t
PPEj,t
ARj,t

= firm j’s change in revenues (Compustat #12) in year t,
= firm j’s gross value of property, plant, and equipment (Compustat #7) in year t,
deflated by firm j’s total assets in year t-1 (Assetsj,t-1, Compustat #6).
= firm j’s change in accounts receivable (Compustat #2) in year t.

Finally we estimate abnormal accruals (AA) for firm j in time t using equation (3), where
we use normal accruals from total accruals resulting in abnormal accruals which are
discretionary and up to the managers to use them. The absolute value of the abnormal accruals
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|AAj,t| is our first earnings quality proxy (EQ1), the higher value of this variable indicates lower
earnings quality for the firm in that year.

1.3.1.2 EQ2 based on modified jones model
Our second earnings quality proxy (EQ2) is calculate similarly using modified jones
model by estimating abnormal current accruals instead of abnormal accruals. First, we calculate
total current accruals (TCA) for firm j at time t using the following equation:

TCAj,t = ( CAj,t − CLj,t − CASHj,t + STDEBTj,t)
Where:
CAj,t
CLj,t
CASHj,t
STDEBTj,t

= firm j’s change in current assets (Compustat #4) in year t,
= firm j’s change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) in year t,
= firm j’s change in cash (Compustat #1) in year t,
= firm j’s change in short-term debt (Compustat #34) in year t,

We estimate normal current accruals (NCA) for each firm j in time t by using two steps;
first we perform industry level (minimum 20 firms) cross-sectional regression for 48 Fama and
French’s, (1997) industries using equation (4) for all firms in Compustat. Then we use the
industry year specific co-efficients from the regression to calculate firm specific normal accruals
(NCA) for each firm scaling by lagged total assets as shown in equation (5). These normal
current accruals are the nondiscretionary current accruals which are part of the total current
accruals of the firms and mangers have no discretion to change. As in first proxy, we use
modified jones model and include changes in revenue and accounts receivables while estimating
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the cross-section regression but delete them while calculate the firm level normal current
accruals.

̂

̂

(5)

Where:
REVj,t
PPEj,t
ARj,t

= firm j’s change in revenues (Compustat #12) in year t,
= firm j’s gross value of property, plant, and equipment (Compustat #7) in year t,
deflated by firm j’s total assets in year t-1 (Assetsj,t-1, Compustat #6).
= firm j’s change in accounts receivable (Compustat #2) in year t.

Finally we estimate abnormal current accruals (ACA) for firm j in time t using equation
(6), where we use normal accruals from total accruals resulting in abnormal accruals which are
discretionary and up to the managers to use them. The absolute value of the abnormal accruals
|ACAj,t| is our second earnings quality proxy (EQ2), the higher value of this variable indicates
lower earnings quality for the firm in that year.

1.3.1.3 EQ3 and EQ4 based on operating cash flow
The previous two earnings quality measures were extensively used in the literature,
recently measures that can capture both the earnings management and operating activities are
13

becoming common.

We propose to use two additional models to exploit the relationship

between accruals and operating cash flow.
Dechow and Dichev, (2002), proposed a measure of accrual quality) based on the
relationship between accruals and cash flows in and around the observed accruals. McNichols
(2002) modified it to include changes in revenues (sales) and PPE (property, plant, and
equipment), because they play a significant role in current accruals calculations and effect
operating cash flow.

Managers of the firm have discretion over timing of the cash flow

recognition and thus the actual accounting and cash flow items might be different as managers
can and use accruals to time the cash flows. As a result the estimation errors in accrual can be
used as a proxy for the quality of earnings, more error indicating lower earnings quality.
We estimate discretionary accruals using this concept by regressing total current accruals
(working capital accruals) on lagged, current, and future cash flows using equation (7). We
estimate this cross-sectionally for each industry (minimum 20 firms) for Fama and French’s 48
industries. All the variables are scaled by the average assets of the firm j over current and
previous years.

Where:
CFOj,t
NIBEj,t

= NIBEj,t − TAj,t
= firm j’s net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18) in year t.
Based on the equation (7), the absolute value of firm level error terms include changes to

revenue and plant, property, and equipment, and is our third earnings quality proxy (EQ3). EQ4
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is the final proxy of earnings quality calculated based on Wysocki, (2008), as the ratio of the
standard deviations of the residuals from regression of current cash flows divided by the
residuals from the above equation (7). All standard deviation calculations are based on t-1 to t-5
years of the residuals, and calculated as a ratio of STD (Residual 1) / STD (Residual 2), where
standard deviation of residual 1 is based on simple regression of working capital accruals on
current cash flows and the standard deviation of residual 2 is based on the regression shown in
equation (7).
The measures EQ1, EQ2 and EQ3 are multiplied by (-1) to orient them in the increasing
direction, higher value of the measure indicate higher earnings quality. The final measure EQ4
is not multiplied by (-1) as it’s a ratio and is oriented in the appropriate direction. The lower
value of EQ in all four cases indicates lower earnings quality.

1.3.2 Share issuance measure (ISSUE)
Annual share issuance measure (ISSUE) is calculated for all firms by using CRSP data
between 1970 and 2012. We start at 1970 due to the limitation imposed by the earnings quality
calculations, for which we require Compustat data and it start in 1970. For each firm in CRSP
we gather number of outstanding shares and the “Factor to Adjust Shares Outstanding” (f). We
then calculate “Adjusted Shares” at time t to reflect the various share distribution events like
stock splits and rights offering. First we calculate cumulative total factor for time t, and then
AdjustedShares at time t. We use the AdjustedShares to compute the annual share issuance at
time t and five year share issuance based on Daniel and Titman, (2006) at time t as below:
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∏

AdjustedSharest = SharesOutstandingt / TotalFactort
ISSUE t, t-11 = Log(shares outstanding t) – Log(shares outstandingt−11)
ISSUEt, t−59 = Log(shares outstanding t) – Log(shares outstanding t−59)

From here on we will refer to annual share issue measure as ISSUE and five year
measure as DT_ISSUE. All our share issuance measures are constructed using Daniel and
Titman (2006) methodology. The annual measure has some additional benefits over the five
year measure. Annual time frame matches with the frequency of filing the financial reports,
updates to CRSP stock prices and other databases tracking frequency related to share issuances.
According to Fama and French (2008), this approach allows measuring all the share issuances
and repurchases, those which were not announced publicly.
These measure can be either positive if overall the share issuance is positive in the time
period used, we call these firms “Net Issuers” where ISSUE is greater than zero. If the overall
share issuance is negative in the time period we call the firms “Net Repurchasers” where ISSUE
is less than zero. For the firms with no share issuance or repurchase activity the ISSUE variables
will be zero.
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1.3.3 Dependent variables
Based on the prior studies of share offering we include the following ISSUE
characteristics as control variables. Most of these variables are used as determinants of ISSUE
by Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) as control variables in their research.
Book-to-Market (B2M) is calculated based on Fama and French (1992), last year’s book
value of common equity (compustat #60) is used when available, otherwise the variable is coded
as zero and eliminated from the sample. The measure is calculated as the natural log of book
value divided by size of the firm, where size is obtained from CRSP as firm market value. A
high B2M indicates a “value firm”, the choices made by firms in this stage of life cycle plays a
major role the way they issue equity, high B2M firms are less likely issue equity when compared
to low B2M firms which are in growth stage and more likely in need of additional equity to grow
the firm.
Size is calculated based on monthly market value of equity from CRSP, we use natural
log of price of shares multiplied by total number of outstanding shares. The other measure we
use for size is natural log of Total Assets from Compustat. Larger companies are more likely to
be tracked by analysts and other investors in the market; this has an effect on the information
asymmetry between managers and investors.
Momentum is calculated from CRSP as last year’s holding period return of the stock, the
time is lagged by one month to avoid positive autocorrelation due to bid-ask bounce. High
momentum stocks are more likely to issue equity, and these two measures are contemporaneous
and correlate positively.
Leverage is debt to equity ratio for a firm. More levered firms are more likely to
undertake risky non positive NPV project to maximize shareholders wealth as majority of the
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risk is born by the debt holders of the firm. At the same time higher leverage is also related to
higher financial distress risk.

These two effects directly affect the motivation for equity

issuance, leading to less issuance by higher levered firms.
Market-to-Book ratio (M2B) is calculated as the ratio of market value of total assets to
the book value of the total assets as in B2M. This measure indicates the valuations of the firm, if
this ratio is higher than one, it indicates overvaluation and this firm tends to take advantage of
this overvaluation and issue equity before the investors realize the true value. This is positively
related to the net issue of equity.

1.3.4 Sample construction
We collect accounting and cash flow data from Compustat and stock information from
CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) databases. We estimate all our earnings quality
measures and share issuance measures and control variables annually over time period from
1970 to 2012. Various filters were used, if the book value is zero or less we eliminate that firm
from the sample, if marketable securities or total assets not available or zero, the firm is deleted
from the sample as these variables are used as scaling variables across all calculation and thus a
denominator of zero or missing value is not acceptable.
We use CCM (compustat and CRSP merge) database the firms not listed in CRSP will
automatically get deleted and only the firms with listing in both CRSP and Compustat are
included in the sample. Firms with industry codes related to financials (SIC code between 6000
and 6999) and utilities (SIC code between 4900 and 4999) were deleted as the firm
characteristics in these industry are influenced by unique regulations and requirements from
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SEC. All the accounting variables are winsorize at the 1 and 99 percentiles on both ends to
eliminate the influence of extreme observations on the rest of the data.

1.3.5 Descriptive statistics
Table 1.1 Panel A: shows the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the study.
The overall sample distributions of EQ1 and EQ2 are highly skewed as shown by the higher
means as compared to medians. We have 142,447 firm year observation of EQ1 and EQ2,
whereas 81,598 firm year observations for EQ3 and EQ4 because they are calculated as standard
deviation of year’s t-1 to t-5, thus losing the first six years of observations for each firm in the
sample. The mean values of all earnings quality proxies are negative (EQ1 -0.379; EQ2 -0.167;
EQ3 -0.038; EQ4 1.123), the last one EQ4 being a ratio is not negative. These values are
consistent with the prior literature Aboody et al. (2005) and Biddle et al. (2009).
The ISSUE and DT_ISSUE variables are both positive and the mean value of 0.114 for
ISSUE indicates that overall the sample firms are net issuers of equity and DT_ISSUE (0.349) is
also indicating the same but over five year time period. ISSUE is calculated using 140,797 firm
years observations over 1970 to 2012. ISSUE is also strongly right skewed as shown by the
mean 0.114 and median is 0.007, holding period returns (momentum) show a slight decrease in
the year t+1 indicating an overall slight loss for the firms who Issue shares. Pontiff and
Woodgate, (2008) already show that the time-series correlations for their sample data suggest
that the ISSUER’s continue to ISSUE in the future, “If the firm buys (sells) shares, it continues
to buy (sell) shares in the future periods”.

They also found share issuance increases and

decreases with high and low returns as shown by positive correlation between ISSUE and
HPRET (momentum) for time periods (-11, 0) and ISSUE (1, 12).
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Panel B of the Table 1.1 shows the person correlations between the variables used in the
study. The preliminary results show that the two measures EQ1 and EQ2 based on modified
jones model are highly correlated (0.43) with each other than compared to their correlation with
EQ3 and EQ4, thus suggesting that EQ1 and EQ2 are capturing similar information about the
firm and EQ3 and EQ4 are capturing different information.
All the earnings quality measures are negatively correlated with ISSUE variable thus
indicating a higher level of earnings quality leads to lower ISSUE and vice versa, this is
consistent with and support our main hypothesis. The correlation between both ISSUE and
DT_ISSUE is 0.324, indicating that they are capturing similar information.
Both issuance measures are negatively correlated with B2M variable and positively
correlated with M2B variable, as these measures shows if the firms are over or undervalued.
These observations are consistent with prior literature which concludes that firms act to exploit
the mispricing caused by valuation. Managers are more likely to sell the shares of a growth firm
with high M2B and buy back the share of a growth firm as indicated by low M2B (Lakonishok
and Lee (2001)).
Leverage is negatively correlated with ISSUE, this is consistent with our prediction that
more levered firms are more likely to undertake risk non positive NPV projects to maximize
shareholders wealth as majority of the risk is born by the debt holders of the firm. At the same
time higher leverage is also related to higher financial distress risk.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics for the firms in CCM (compustat - crsp merged database) during the 1970
to 2012 sample period. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis while panel B
presents Pearson correlations for these variables. ISSUE and DT_ISSUE are calculated from CRSP database for the
same time frame as the sample. ISSUE = [Log(shares outstanding, t) – Log(shares outstanding, t−11)]; ISSUE−59,0
= [Log(shares outstanding, t) – Log(shares outstanding, t−59)] the variables are measured at the end of December
for the period between 1970 and 2012. B2M is the ratio of log (book value of equity to the market value of the
equity); Size is the log of market capitalization calculated based on the price and outstanding shares of the firm.
Momentum is previous years return and is contemporaneous with the ISSUE variable. Total Assets and Sales are
from company financial data. M2B is the ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of the total assets.
Leverage is debt to equity ratio of the firm. Earnings Quality is measured four different ways, EQ1 and EQ2 are is
abnormal accruals and abnormal current accruals based on modified jones model, Dechow et al, and (1995). EQ3 is
earnings quality as proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by Francis et al. (2005). EQ4 is a
modified version of the accruals quality measure proposed by Wysocki (2008). All the earnings quality measure
except EQ4 are multiplied by -1 as proposed by Biddle et al. (2009) to align them in the increasing direction, thus
higher value of measure indicates higher earnings quality.
Panel A:

N

Mean

Median

SD

Q1

Q3

ISSUE
DT_ISSUE
B2M
Size
Momentum
Total Assets
Sales
M2B
Leverage

140,797
140,797
138,781
142,220
140,797
142,447
142,447
142,225
142,225

0.114
0.349
-0.547
4.527
0.155
727.846
753.002
1.861
0.208

0.007
0.005
-0.494
4.398
0.047
102.281
112.410
1.320
0.129

0.349
0.879
0.924
2.128
0.651
1994.330
2082.150
2.176
0.228

0.000
0.000
-1.076
2.942
-0.257
28.326
28.321
1.004
0.008

0.072
0.554
0.055
6.032
0.399
446.722
482.119
1.973
0.340

EQ1
EQ2
EQ3
EQ4

142,447
142,447
81,598

-0.379
-0.167
-0.038

-0.085
-0.052
-0.030

7.039
1.357
0.032

-0.166
-0.118
-0.046

-0.040
-0.021
-0.019

81,598

1.123

1.023

0.645

0.892

1.201
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Panel B: Correlation Matrix of Variables
ISSUE

DT_ISSUE

B2M

Size

Momentum

Total Assets

M2B

Leverage

EQ1

EQ2

DT_ISSUE

0.324***

B2M

-0.202***

-0.149***

Size

-0.142***

0.265***

-0.408**

Momentum

0.164***

0.035***

-0.264***

0.153***

Total Assets

0.013***

0.108***

-0.064***

0.560***

0.003

M2B

0.161***

0.079***

-0.634***

0.200***

0.221***

-0.027***

Leverage

-0.101***

-0.072***

0.426***

-0.215***

-0.131***

0.059***

-0.283***

EQ1

-0.009***

0.011***

0.007**

-0.033***

-0.001

-0.048***

0.001***

-0.004

EQ2

-0.004

0.026***

0.012***

0.006**

0.003

-0.021***

-0.007

-0.001

0.427***

EQ3

-0.007*

0.044***

0.181***

0.231***

0.015***

0.153***

-0.212***

0.140***

0.194***

0.228***

EQ4

-0.012***

-0.032***

0.007**

-0.022***

-0.016***

0.025***

0.000

0.018***

-0.038***

-0.053***

*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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EQ3

0.084***

1.4

Analysis and Results

1.4.1 Univariate Analysis
Table 1.2 shows the results of the univariate analysis of all the earnings quality variables
(EQ1, EQ2, EQ3, and EQ4). The earnings quality variables are compared between two samples
of both ISSUE and DT_ISSUE variables. Each of the issue variables are divided into two
groups, if the value of ISSUE is > 0, than the firm is considered Net Issuers and if <0 the firm is
considered as Net Repurchasers, the no changes in ISSUE=0 are deleted from this sample thus a
decrease in overall sample size to 86,401 firm year observations for Net Issuers and 24,949 firm
year observations for Net Repurchasers for EQ1 and EQ2. For EQ3 and EQ4, the firm year
observations are 50,221 and 16,994 respectively. DT_ISSUE is also prepared similarly by
deleting DT_ISSUE=0 and end up with 67,752 firm year observations for Net Issuers and 18,966
for Net repurchasers. For EQ3 and EQ4 the firm year observations are 57,291 and 16,291
respectively.
The results in panel A (ISSUE) presents univariate test results for the differences of mean
between two groups of earnings quality variables divided into net issuers and net repurchsers.
EQ1 for Net Issuers is -0.15 as compared to -0.12 for Net Repurchasers with a statistically
significant mean difference of -.023. This indicates that Net Repurchasers have a higher
earnings quality as compared to Net Issuers. All the other earnings quality measures show
similar overall results concluding that Net Issuers and Net Repurchasers are statistically different
in their measure of earnings quality. All four earnings quality measures are constantly higher in
value for Net Repurchasers thus providing preliminary support for our entire hypothesis.
Panel B (DT_ISSUE) presents univariate test results for the differences of mean between
two groups of earnings quality variables divided into net issuers and net repurchsers. EQ1 for
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Net Issuers is -0.11 as compared to -0.10 for Net Repurchasers with a statistically significant
mean difference of -.004. This indicates that Net Repurchasers have a higher earnings quality as
compared to Net Issuers. All the other earnings quality measures show similar overall results
concluding that Net Issuers and Net Repurchasers are statistically different in their measure of
earnings quality. All four earnings quality measures are constantly higher in value for Net
Repurchasers just like ISSUE measure thus providing preliminary support for our entire
hypothesis.

1.4.1 Multivariate Analysis
To test our hypotheses about earnings quality and share issuance for all issuers, Net
Issuers, and Net Repurchasers we implement the following empirical specification using OLS
regression with heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. ISSUE variable is based on Pontiff
and Woodgate (2008) is our dependent variable, and earnings quality measures and other control
variables like B2M, momentum, size, total assets, M2B, and leverage as discussed in our data
description section:

ISSUEit = 0 + 1EQit + 2B2Mit + 3MEit + 4Momentumit + 5TotalAssetsit + 6M2Bit
+ 7Leverageit + it

To test our main Hypothesis H1, if share issue depends on earnings quality, we run four
models of the above regression each with EQ1, EQ2, EQ3, and EQ4 respectively and report all
the results in table 1.3. Each column is reporting separate results for the above regression with
130,078 firm year observations for EQ1 and EQ2 while 74,327 for the other two earnings quality
proxies. The regression is calculated based on data for the time period 1970 to 2012. The
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control variables are calculated as described in the data sections of the paper. All the earnings
quality measure except EQ4 are multiplied by -1 as proposed by Biddle et al. (2009) to align
them in the increasing direction, thus higher value of measure indicates higher earnings quality.
We expect each earnings quality variable to have negative and significant relationship with the
ISSUE variable indicating that poor earnings quality results in net issuance of shares for all firms
in our sample.

ISSUEit (Net Issuers) = 0 + 1EQit + 2B2Mit + 3MEit + 4Momentumit +

5TotalAssetsit + 6M2Bit + 7Leverageit + it

To test our second hypothesis (H2) for Net Issuers we run four models of the above
regression each with EQ1, EQ2, EQ3, and EQ4 respectively and report all the results in table 1.3.
Each column is reporting separate results for the above regression with 84,402 firm year
observations for EQ1 and EQ2 while 49,217 for the other two earnings quality proxies. The
regression is calculated based on data for the time period 1970 to 2012. The control variables are
calculated as described in the data sections of the paper. All the earnings quality measure except
EQ4 are multiplied by -1 as proposed by Biddle et al. (2009) to align them in the increasing
direction, thus higher value of measure indicates higher earnings quality. We expect each
earnings quality variable to have negative and significant relationship with the ISSUE variable
indicating that poor earnings quality results in net issuance of shares for “Net Issuers” (ISSUE >
0) firms in our sample.
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ISSUEit (Net Repurchasers) = 0 + 1EQit + 2B2Mit + 3MEit + 4Momentumit +

5TotalAssetsit + 6M2Bit + 7Leverageit + it

To test our third hypothesis (H3) for Net Repurchasers we run four models of the above
regression each with EQ1, EQ2, EQ3, and EQ4 respectively and report all the results in table 1.3.
Each column is reporting separate results for the above regression with 24,571 firm year
observations for EQ1 and EQ2 while 16,789 for the other two earnings quality proxies. The
regression is calculated based on data for the time period 1970 to 2012. The control variables are
calculated as described in the data sections of the paper. All the earnings quality measure except
EQ4 are multiplied by -1 as proposed by Biddle et al. (2009) to align them in the increasing
direction, thus higher value of measure indicates higher earnings quality. We expect each
earnings quality variable to have positive and significant relationship with the ISSUE variable
indicating that poor earnings quality results in net issuance of shares for “Net Repurchasers”
(ISSUE< 0) firms in our sample.
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Table 1.2: Univariate Analysis
This table presents the univariate analysis of all the earnings quality variables (EQ1, EQ2, EQ3, and EQ4). The
earnings quality variables are compared between two samples of both ISSUE and DT_ISSUE variables. Each of
the issue variables are divided into two groups, if the value of ISSUE is > 0 it is considered net issue and if <0 it
is considered as net repurchasers, the no changes in ISSUE=0 are deleted from this sample. DT_ISSUE is also
prepared similarly. Panel A (ISSSUE) presents univariate tests for the differences of mean between two group’s
earnings quality variables divided into net issuers and net repurchsers. Panel B (DT_ISSSUE) presents
univariate tests for the differences of mean between two group’s earnings quality variables divided into net
issuers and net repurchsers.
Panel A: Univariate Tests for ISSUE (+) vs. ISSUE (-)
N

Net Issuers (+)
Mean
Std Dev

N

Net Repurchasers (-)
Mean
Std Dev

Mean Difference

EQ1

86,401

-0.15

0.21

24,949

-0.12

0.17

-0.023***

EQ2

86,401

-0.10

0.15

24,949

-0.08

0.13

-0.022***

EQ3

50,221

-0.04

0.03

16,994

-0.03

0.02

-0.004***

EQ4

50,221

1.09

1.08

16,994

1.10

1.09

-0.001***

Panel B: Univariate Tests for DT_ISSUE (+) vs. DT_ISSUE (-)
N

Net Issuers (+)
Mean
Std Dev

Net Repurchasers (-)
N
Mean
Std Dev

Mean Difference

EQ1

67,752

-0.11

0.11

18,966

-0.10

0.11

-0.004***

EQ2

67,752

-0.07

0.08

18,966

-0.07

0.09

-0.002***

EQ3

57,291

-0.04

0.02

16,423

-0.03

0.02

-0.001***

EQ4

57,291

1.08

0.35

16,423

1.11

0.37

-0.023***

T-tests and non-parametric tests are used to test mean differences. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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The main results as shown in Table 1.3 support our hypothesis H1, the earnings quality
variables EQ1, EQ2, and EQ4 are negatively and statistically significantly related to the
dependent variable ISSUE. In Model1 the coefficient estimate (-0.089) for EQ1 earnings quality
measure is significantly negative after controlling for other factors that might affect the firms’
propensity to issue shares. Similarly the earnings quality measure EQ2 (-0.112), and EQ4 (0.009) similar and consistent result with EQ1. Thus we conclude that these measures are
predicting that higher earnings quality leads to lower ISSUE and all the results are statistically
significant at 1% level. As a robustness test we run all regression analysis using DT_ISSUE as
dependent variable instead of ISSUE and find overall similar results.
Table 1.4 shows the results for Net Issuers (ISSUE > 0) group of firms and support our
hypothesis H2, the earnings quality variables EQ1, EQ2, and EQ4 are negatively and statistically
significantly related to the dependent variable ISSUE. In Model1 the coefficient estimate (0.126) for EQ1 earnings quality measure is significantly negative after controlling for other
factors that might affect the firms’ propensity to issue shares. Similarly the earnings quality
measure EQ2 (-0.165), and EQ4 (-0.010) similar and consistent result with EQ1. Thus we
conclude that these measures are predicting that higher earnings quality leads to lower ISSUE for
Net Issuers and all the results are statistically significant at 1% level. As a robustness test we run
all regression analysis using DT_ISSUE as dependent variable instead of ISSUE and find overall
similar results.
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Table 1.3: Share Issue and Earnings Quality
The dependent variable is the aggregate share issuance measure ISSUE based on Pontiff and Woodgate (2008). It is
calculated based on data from CRSP database for the time period 1970 to 2012. ISSUE = [Log(shares outstanding, t)
– Log(shares outstanding, t−11)]; B2M is the ratio of log (book value of equity to the market value of the equity);
Size is the log of market capitalization calculated based on the price and outstanding shares of the firm. Momentum
is previous years return and is contemporaneous with the ISSUE variable. Total Assets and Sales are from company
financial data. M2B is the ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of the total assets. Leverage is debt
to equity ratio of the firm. Earnings Quality is measured four different ways, EQ1 and EQ2 are is abnormal accruals
and abnormal current accruals based on modified jones model, Dechow et al, and (1995). EQ3 is earnings quality as
proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by Francis et al. (2005). EQ4 is a modified version of the
accruals quality measure proposed by Wysocki (2008). All the earnings quality measure except EQ4 are multiplied
by -1 as proposed by Biddle et al. (2009) to align them in the increasing direction, thus higher value of measure
indicates higher earnings quality. The regressions are OLS with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors
reported in the brackets below the parameter estimates.
Dependent variable: ISSUE
(EQ1)

(EQ2)

(EQ3)

(EQ4)

0.026***

0.025***

0.033***

0.035***

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.006)

(0.006)

-0.089***

-0.112***

0.138**

-0.009***

(0.005)

(0.007)

(0.056)

(0.004)

-0.008***

-0.007***

-0.014***

-0.013***

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.003)

0.072***

0.072***

0.064***

0.065***

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.004)

0.059***

0.059***

0.068***

0.068***

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.003)

-0.062***

-0.062***

-0.057***

-0.057***

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.004)

0.004***

0.004***

0.009***

0.009***

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.002)

0.118***

0.121***

0.118***

0.120***

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.009)

(0.009)

Industry Dummies

No

No

No

No

Year Dummies

No

No

No

No

R2

0.068

0.067

0.062

0.063

No. Firms years

130,078

130,078

74,327

74,327

Intercept
EQ
B2M
ME
Momentum
Total Assets
M2B
Leverage

*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 1.5 shows the results for Net Repurchasers (ISSUE < 0) group of firms and support
our hypothesis H2, the earnings quality variables EQ1, EQ2, and EQ3 are positively and
statistically significantly related to the dependent variable ISSUE. In Model1 the coefficients
estimate (0.076) for EQ1 earnings quality measure is significantly positive after controlling for
other factors that might affect the firms’ propensity to issue shares. Similarly the earnings
quality measure EQ2 (0.118), and EQ3 (1.181) similar and consistent result with EQ1. Thus we
conclude that these measures are predicting that higher earnings quality leads to higher ISSUE
for the Net Repurchasers and all the results are statistically significant at 1% level. As a
robustness test we run all regression analysis using DT_ISSUE as dependent variable instead of
ISSUE and find overall similar results.
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Table 1.4: Share Issue and Earnings Quality: Net Issuers
The dependent variable is the aggregate share issuance measure ISSUE based on Pontiff and Woodgate (2008). It is
calculated based on data from CRSP database for the time period 1970 to 2012. ISSUE = [Log(shares outstanding, t)
– Log(shares outstanding, t−11)]; B2M is the ratio of log (book value of equity to the market value of the equity);
Size is the log of market capitalization calculated based on the price and outstanding shares of the firm. Momentum
is previous years return and is contemporaneous with the ISSUE variable. Total Assets and Sales are from company
financial data. M2B is the ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of the total assets. Leverage is debt
to equity ratio of the firm. Earnings Quality is measured four different ways, EQ1 and EQ2 are is abnormal accruals
and abnormal current accruals based on modified jones model, Dechow et al, and (1995). EQ3 is earnings quality as
proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by Francis et al. (2005). EQ4 is a modified version of the
accruals quality measure proposed by Wysocki (2008). All the earnings quality measure except EQ4 are multiplied
by -1 as proposed by Biddle et al. (2009) to align them in the increasing direction, thus higher value of measure
indicates higher earnings quality. The regressions are OLS with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors
reported in the brackets below the parameter estimates.
Dependent variable: ISSUE(>0; net issuers)
Intercept
EQ

(EQ1)

(EQ2)

(EQ3)

(EQ4)

0.081***

0.078***

0.079***

0.083***

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.008)

(0.008)

-0.126***

-0.165***

0.116**

-0.010**

(0.007)

(0.010)

(0.069)

(0.005)

Control Variables (yes)

-0.008***

-0.007***

-0.014***

-0.013***

Industry Dummies

No

No

No

No

Year Dummies

No

No

No

No

R2

0.064

0.063

0.064

0.063

No. Firms years

84,402

84,402

49,217

49,217

*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 1.5: Share Issue and Earnings Quality: Net Issuers
The dependent variable is the aggregate share issuance measure ISSUE based on Pontiff and Woodgate (2008). It is
calculated based on data from CRSP database for the time period 1970 to 2012. ISSUE = [Log(shares outstanding, t)
– Log(shares outstanding, t−11)]; B2M is the ratio of log (book value of equity to the market value of the equity);
Size is the log of market capitalization calculated based on the price and outstanding shares of the firm. Momentum
is previous years return and is contemporaneous with the ISSUE variable. Total Assets and Sales are from company
financial data. M2B is the ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of the total assets. Leverage is debt
to equity ratio of the firm. Earnings Quality is measured four different ways, EQ1 and EQ2 are is abnormal accruals
and abnormal current accruals based on modified jones model, Dechow et al, and (1995). EQ3 is earnings quality as
proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by Francis et al. (2005). EQ4 is a modified version of the
accruals quality measure proposed by Wysocki (2008). All the earnings quality measure except EQ4 are multiplied
by -1 as proposed by Biddle et al. (2009) to align them in the increasing direction, thus higher value of measure
indicates higher earnings quality. The regressions are OLS with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors
reported in the brackets below the parameter estimates.
Dependent variable: ISSUE (< 0; net repurchasers)
(EQ1)
Intercept

(EQ2)

(EQ3)

(EQ4)

0.026***

-0.120***

-0.055***

-0.120***

(0.004)

(0.007)

(0.009)

(0.009)

0.076***

0.118***

1.181***

-0.004

(0.011)

(0.016)

(0.106)

(0.004)

Industry Dummies

No

No

No

No

Year Dummies

No

No

No

No

R2

0.046

0.046

0.061

0.045

No. Firms year

24,571

24,571

16,789

16,789

EQ

Control Variables (yes)

*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

1.5

Conclusion
The main questions we explore is if increase in information asymmetry between mangers

and investors are related to net share issuance. This will be the first study to use the new ISSUE
measure to proxy the net share issuance and measure the information asymmetry as a proxy for
earnings quality as compared to other proxies used like stock return volatility, bid-ask spread and
analysts’ forecasts.
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Accounting earnings is used widely to measure the performance of a firm, the quality of
this information is used as a proxy for information asymmetry between the mangers and the
outside investors. We use several measures based on discretionary accruals to measure earnings
quality, we use modified jones model and newer Dechow and Dichev (2002) model using
operating cash flows to measure earnings quality.
We conclude that the ISSUE (net equity issuance) has an inverse relationship with quality
of the earnings reported by the firms. Firms with poor (good) earnings quality have higher
(lower) information asymmetry and tend to issue more (less) equity and this finding was true for
a variety of earnings quality measures used in the literature.
Firms with negative net issuance (Net Repurchasers) are more like to have higher quality
of earnings; this is true across 3 of the proxies we used for the earnings quality. On the contrary
firms with positive net issuance (Net Issuers) were found to have lower quality of earnings.
Additional robustness tests found that overall these findings are true for another alternate
measure of net share issue (DT_ISSUE).
We propose to conduct additional robustness tests controlling for industry and time fixed
effects, we expect to find the results to be consistent with the current ones. Additionally we
propose to test the issuance efficiency, for this we intend to construct a new measure to test if the
earnings quality is related to Issuance efficiency. Here we borrow the setup from Biddle et al.
(2009), where they test the relationship between financial reporting quality and investment for
firms in over/under investment operating conditions.
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Chapter 2: Put Option Sales and Earnings Quality: Evidence of Market
Timing
We provide evidence that earnings quality is high for the sample of Put Option Selling
(POS) and they are actively timing the market compared to a matching sample of firms. We
hypothesize that due to information asymmetry; managers of POS firms have additional private
information and estimate their stock was mispriced (undervalued) and expect the stock price to
increase in the near future, this leads to higher earnings quality (abnormal accruals). We provide
additional evidence of market timing (mispricing due to undervaluation) using Residual Income
Model (RIM).

2.1

Introduction
Firms selling put options on their own stock were taking on additional significant risk and

gaining the premium paid for the put. These firms might be motivated by reducing transaction
costs of repurchase program, reduce dilution due to employee stock option (ESO) plan, mitigate
agency costs, signaling, or simply timing the market based on private information that their stock
price is undervalued.
Put option sales are not generally disclosed (announced) publicly ex-ante nor at the time
of the event, they are reported and filed with SEC in the subsequent quarters (ex-post), and thus
they are not used as a signaling mechanism by the managers. This put selling is usually
associated with open market repurchase announcements by the firm; this practice was most
prevalent in the time period of 1991-2004 generally among the larger profitable firms. Jenter,
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Lewellen, and Warner (2011) show that firms engage in POS mainly due to market timing, but
they could not rule out the other internal firm specific explanations.
There is a growing body of literature which examines the effect of equity mispricing on
various financing, investment and other corporate activities2. Put option sales provide a unique
insight into decision making and processes of managers having private information under
information asymmetry. According to Jenter et al. 2011, “The put option sale setting helps
address the issues of both motivation and measurement, and thus provides a cleaner test” of
market timing. A typical put option in this test expires in 6 months thus providing clean short
term effects instead of studying problematic long term effects. Since put option sale is a levered
bet by firms, we propose using earning quality measure to test the market timing explanation and
predict that these firms will have higher quality of earnings as there is no need to manage
earnings in this setup.
There has been a significant amount of research done regarding earnings quality in
Finance and Accounting areas. A comprehensive discussion about earnings quality is provided
by Dechow, Ge, Schrand (2010), where the authors summarize about 350 academic papers and
identify the best measurement and test variable. Dichev, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2012),
conduct an extensive survey evidence about CFO opinion’s about motivations of existing
earnings quality measures and impact regulation. We add to this vast literature by studying the
relationship between earnings quality and POS activity of firms.
Our main contribution is to extend the literature in earnings quality area by first providing
evidence that POS firms have high earnings quality compared to sample firms and are thus
timing the market (stock price) as initially shown by Jenter, Lewellen, and Warner (2011).

2

The

Baker and Wurgler (2002), Graham and Harvey (2001), Elliott et al. (2007), Huang and Ritter (2005), Leary and
Roberts (2005), Hovakimian (2006)
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level of earnings quality is very important; we consider earning quality as either low or high
relative to a matching sample. Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, Lakonishok (2001), show that there is a
positive relationship between earnings quality and stock returns. A low earnings quality firm is
expected to have low future stock returns thus its stock will be currently overvalued. Whereas as
a high earnings quality firm is expected to have higher future stock returns and thus its stocks
will be currently undervalued.
Return volatility is not a major factor as evidenced by high quality of earnings for the
sample firms. Return volatility is negatively related to earnings quality (based on accruals), high
level of earnings quality indicate low level of future return volatility (Rajgopal and
Venkatachalam, 2006). Our initial results show that the put selling firms have a higher earnings
quality as compared to the sample firms and thus the stock price is undervalued and firms are
timing the market in expectation of future raise in stock price.
Additionally we show that market timing explains put sales by firms. Here we use
residual income model (RIM) as defined by Ohlson (1991, 1995) to test the mispricing
(over/under valuation) as it is considered in literature as better valuation model for stocks
(Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan, 1999). RIM will predicts over 20% of the variation in future stock
returns (Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan, 1999). Using put option sales data (shorter term) as
opposed to other larger data sets like SEO or repurchases (longer term) will eliminate potential
mean reversion in valuation. Indications of undervaluation using RIM is consistent with our first
findings and supports our main results that market timing is the main motive for selling put
options by firms.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the prior literature,
Section 3 describes the data and methodology, Section 4 describes the analysis and presents the
results, and Section 5 offers conclusions.

2.2

Literature and Hypothesis
Gibson, Povel, and Singh (2006) argued that put selling firms are signaling to market

about undervaluation of their stock price, McDonald (2004) and Atanasov et al. (2007) show that
signaling is not the main motive but found an abnormal stock return for the POS firms. Angle et
al. (1997) and Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) argue that put option sales are executed due to
undervalued stock price and managers try to profit with this private information.

Jenter,

Lewellen, and Warner (2011) show that market timing by mangers is the main reason for put
sales and did not rule out other possible explanations.
Earnings quality has been used in the literature many times. Teoh, Welch, and
Wong (1998) examine accruals around SEO.

Sloan (1996) show that overvaluing of low

earnings quality firms is corrected over time, Penman and Zhang (2002), Dechow and Schrand
(2004) and Melumand and Nissim (2009) show that earnings quality predicts the future
sustainable persistent earnings. The effect of earnings quality on financing and investment
activities like SEO (Rangan 1998), stock repurchases (Hribar et at. 2006); IPO, Insider trading
(Aboody et al. 2005), stock returns (Chan et al. 2001) and return volatility (Chen et al. 2008)
were extensively studied.
Market price of a stock is a very noisy measure of its intrinsic value. There has been
much research done to determine the best possible model and Residual Income Model (RIM)
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was found to be a better valuation model. In the existing finance literature market-to-book
(M2B) was widely used as proxy for undervaluation/mispricing, and this measure does not
clearly differentiate between the actual mispricing (due to asymmetric information) and growth
opportunities of the firm. RIM decomposes M2B into two components which can be used to
measure mispricing independently from the growth opportunities.
Previous researchers have used insiders trading and M2B to measure the level of
mispricing and they were found to be noisy or overlapping interpretations with other measures.
Residual Income Model (RIM) based on Ohlson (1991, 1995) is used lately to measure market
timing. RIM is a fundamental valuation method which determines the value of a firm by
calculating the present value of the future abnormal earnings (intrinsic value). Lee, Myers, and
Swaminathan (1999) use RIM and show that it is a better predictor of variation in future returns.
Elliott et al. (2006) and other researchers have used this model to measure the effect of equity
misvaluation in various corporate financing decisions.
RIM model is more sensitive to measurement biases due to conservative accounting. That
is, “book value tends to be negatively biased while future residual income can either be
positively or negatively biased. Choi et al. (2006) further suggest that the negatively biased
estimates from the RIM model as documented by Dechow et al. (1999) is perhaps driven by
conservative accounting”. Even after adjusting for the effect of conservative accounting, the
model performance improves in terms of bias but not accuracy. This still leaves an open
question regarding the accuracy of RIM.
There is a multitude of literature in accounting and finance in the area of earnings quality
and earnings management, looking at different financing activities of the firm and their
relationship to the corporate activities. Bothe determinants and the consequences are listed in by
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DeChow et al., (2010) in their summary of literature in earnings quality area, most of these
studies examine if firms are interested in economic incentives and thus as a result manage their
earnings and at the same time the consequences of firms managing their earnings. All the
corporate financing and investing actives were reviewed and the proxies used in all the studies
were summarized.
Earnings quality has been used in the literature many times. Teoh, Welch, and Wong,
(1998) examine accruals around SEO. Sloan, (1996) show that overvaluing of low earnings
quality firms is corrected over time, Penman and Zhang, (2002), Dechow and Schrand, (2004)
and Melumand and Nissim, (2009) show that earnings quality predicts the future sustainable
persistent earnings. The effect of earnings quality on financing and investment activities like
SEO (Rangan 1998), stock repurchases (Hribar et at., 2006); IPO, Insider trading (Aboody et al.,
2005), stock returns (Chan et al., 2001) and return volatility (Chen et al., 2008) were extensively
studied. This line of research consistently concludes that poor earning quality leads to
Earnings quality increases with the level of information asymmetry between the investors
and mangers. Trueman and Titman, (1988) conclude that the information asymmetry between
management and investors is a required for managing earnings, because shareholders have less
information about firm’s performance and future prospects if they have less information than
management. In such case, management can use its accounting discretion to manage reported
earnings thus managing the quality of the earnings. In addition management’s discretionary
ability to manage earnings increases as the information asymmetry between management and
shareholders increases. Richardson, (1998) provides empirical evidence consistent with Trueman
and Titman. He concludes that the quality of the earnings as measured by bid-ask spread and
analysts earnings forecast variance is directly related to the level of information asymmetry.
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Lobo and Zhou, (2001) find that disclosure is negatively related to earnings quality. Firms that
disclose less tend to engage more in earnings management and vice versa. As corporate
disclosure is negatively related to information asymmetry, this provides indirect evidence on the
relationship between information asymmetry and earnings quality. The information asymmetry
in the corporate financings activities creates an opportunity for management to engage in
earnings management thus reducing the quality of earnings.
Teoh, Welch and Wong, (1998) find that earnings management is related to the
underperformance of SEOs. “They find that the annual growth in issuers’ asset-scaled net
income significantly exceeds that of matched non-issuers”. Using quarterly data, Rangan, (1998)
finds that “earnings management is most significant in the quarter in which the offering is
announced and in the following quarter”. Thus showing evidence that firms actively manage
earnings two quarters before.
Lee and Masulis, (2009) propose to use accounting information quality measures to
measure the information asymmetry between mangers and outside investors. They show that
poor quality of the accounting information increases the overall floatation cost of SEO issues as
a result of larger underwriting costs.
Extending this line of research Biddle et al., (2006, 2009) show that higher earnings
quality increases the investment efficiency by reducing the externalities like moral hazard and
adverse selection which tend to reduce the investment efficiency.

They also study the

relationship between earnings quality and investment efficiency in a country level study and
conclude that higher earnings quality reduced information asymmetry between mangers and
investors and this result is pronounced when creditors are supplying capital.
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2.3

Data and Methodology
The earlier studies of earnings quality use discretionary accruals as a proxy.

In a

summary of literature documented by Dechow, Ge, and Schrand, (2010) discretionary accruals
was the proxy most used in about 350 in the area. Accruals are accounting entries used to adjust
the operating cash flows when calculating the accounting earnings of a firm, while discretionary
accruals are the part of these accruals which are made solely on the managers own discretion.
While accounting earnings are the most used measure of a firm’s performance, the discretionary
nature of some accruals will induce measurement errors, thus the quality of the accruals is used
in the same context as earnings quality. Discretionary accruals can both increase or decrease as
they can be used by manger to hide poor performance or use current earnings in future (DeFond
and Park, 1997). We use four measures of earnings quality (EQ) based on Francis et al. (2005),
and Aboody et al. (2005).
First two (EQ1 and EQ2) are based on Dechow et al. (1995), and Dechow, Sloan, and
Sweeney (1995), modified jones model. We calculate total accruals as the difference between
earnings and operations cash flows. All methods use accounting information and differentiate
accruals into nondiscretionary (normal) and discretionary (abnormal) parts. The absolute value
of the discretionary accruals (abnormal) is the measure of the earnings quality, the lower
absolute value of this indicates higher earnings quality and vice, versa. We follow the Aboody et
al., (2005) methodology details to calculate all four EQ measures.
We obtained put selling firms data from Dirk Jenter3 and used the same filtering
procedures. We obtained stock and accounting information from Compustat and CRSP merged

3

We acknowledge the data provided by Dirk Jenter from his research paper titled “Security Issue Timing: What do
managers know, and when do they know it? JF 2011”.
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database (CCM). Due to unique requirements of calculating earnings quality measure we ended
up with a finally list of 364 unique firm years of put selling issuers.
2.3.1 Earnings quality proxies
We calculate all earnings quality proxy measure (EQ1 and EQ2) using data from
financial statements from Compustat starting from year 1970.
EQ1 based on modified jones model
First we calculate the difference between earnings and operating cash flows as total
accruals (TA) for all firms j in time (year) t based on the following equation:

TAj,t = ( CAj,t − CLj,t − CASH j,t + STDEBTj,t − DEPNj,t )
Where:
CAj,t
CLj,t
CASHj,t
STDEBTj,t
DEPNj,t

= firm j’s change in current assets (Compustat #4) in year t,
= firm j’s change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) in year t,
= firm j’s change in cash (Compustat #1) in year t,
= firm j’s change in short-term debt (Compustat #34) in year t,
= firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat #14) in year t

We estimate normal accruals (NA) for each firm j in time t by using two steps; first we
perform industry level (minimum 20 firms) cross-sectional regression for 48 Fama and French’s,
(1997) industries using equation (1) for all firms in Compustat. Then we use the industry year
specific co-efficients from the regression to calculate firm specific normal accruals (NA) for
each firm scaling by lagged total assets as shown in equation (2). These normal accruals are the
nondiscretionary accruals which are part of the total accruals of the firms and mangers have no
discretion to change.

We use modified jones model and use revenues including accounts
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receivables while estimating the cross-section regression but delete them while calculate the firm
level normal accruals.

Where:
REVj,t
PPEj,t
ARj,t

= firm j’s change in revenues (Compustat #12) in year t,
= firm j’s gross value of property, plant, and equipment (Compustat #7) in year t,
deflated by firm j’s total assets in year t-1 (Assetsj,t-1, Compustat #6).
= firm j’s change in accounts receivable (Compustat #2) in year t.

Finally we estimate abnormal accruals (AA) for firm j in time t using equation (3), where
we normal accruals from total accruals resulting in abnormal accruals which are discretionary
and up to the managers to use them. The absolute value of the abnormal accruals |AAj,t| is our
first earnings quality proxy (EQ1), the higher value of this variable indicates lower earnings
quality for the firm in that year.
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EQ2 based on modified jones model
Our second earnings quality proxy (EQ2) is calculate similar using modified jones model
by estimating abnormal current accruals instead of abnormal accruals. First we calculate total
current accruals (TCA) form firm j at time t using the following equation:
TCAj,t = ( CAj,t − CLj,t − CASHj,t + STDEBTj,t)
Where:
CAj,t
CLj,t
CASHj,t
STDEBTj,t

= firm j’s change in current assets (Compustat #4) in year t,
= firm j’s change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) in year t,
= firm j’s change in cash (Compustat #1) in year t,
= firm j’s change in short-term debt (Compustat #34) in year t,

We estimate normal current accruals (NCA) for each firm j in time t by using two steps;
first we perform industry level (minimum 20 firms) cross-sectional regression for 48 Fama and
French’s, (1997) industries using equation (4) for all firms in Compustat. Then we use the
industry year specific co-efficients from the regression to calculate firm specific normal accruals
(NCA) for each firm scaling by lagged total assets as shown in equation (5). These normal
current accruals are the nondiscretionary current accruals which are part of the total current
accruals of the firms and mangers have no discretion to change. As in first proxy, we use
modified jones model and use revenues including accounts receivables while estimating the
cross-section regression but delete them while calculate the firm level normal current accruals.

̂

̂
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(5)

Where:
REVj,t
PPEj,t
ARj,t

= firm j’s change in revenues (Compustat #12) in year t,
= firm j’s gross value of property, plant, and equipment (Compustat #7) in year t,
deflated by firm j’s total assets in year t-1 (Assetsj,t-1, Compustat #6).
= firm j’s change in accounts receivable (Compustat #2) in year t.

Finally we estimate abnormal current accruals (ACA) for firm j in time t using equation
(6), where we normal accruals from total accruals resulting in abnormal accruals which are
discretionary and up to the managers to use them. The absolute value of the abnormal accruals
|ACAj,t| is our first earnings quality proxy (EQ2), the higher value of this variable indicates lower
earnings quality for the firm in that year.

2.3.2 Residual Income Model
The initial data for calculating RIM is obtained from CCM from 1970 – 2009
excluding utilities and financials and –ve book value firms. The RIM calculation requires
that we only keep firms that survived at least 4 years. We divide firms into industry
classification based on Fama and French 48 industries. The cost of capital is calculated
based on Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) method using short-term T-Bill rates.
Using RIM we calculate the intrinsic value per share of the firm based on the future
abnormal earnings (V0), this is scaled by the firm’s market value for share (P).
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VP0 = V0/P0
VP0 is the misvaluation at time=0, V0 is the intrinsic value of the stock at time=0, and P0
is the market price of the stock at time=0. VP>1 indicates undervaluation of the stock and VP<1
indicates overvaluation.

2.3.3 Sample
Table 2.1 reports sample frequencies showing the distribution of unique firms selling put
options in a given year and in Panel B number of firms in the top 5 Fama, French 48 industrial
groups. The result show that put selling activity is at its peak in year 2000 and the percentage of
overall firms is relatively small at 0.555%. Computer and Software industry was the biggest and
followed by Electronic Equipment industry; these two are high growth industries in that time
frame between 1991 and 2004.
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Table 2.1: Sample
This table presents the number of sample firms engaged in put selling and total CCM firms for which data is
available by year (Panel A) and by Fama and French 49 industry (Panel B). We only report industries which are
top 5 in selling put options.
Sample
A. Firm distribution by year
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

CCM
1
3
6
12
13
12
16
18
21
25
22
13
4
2
168

%
3,609
3,932
4,838
5,285
5,340
5,607
5,515
5,105
4,916
4,504
3,786
3,878
4,029
4,262
64,606

0.027
0.076
0.124
0.227
0.243
0.214
0.290
0.352
0.427
0.555
0.581
0.335
0.099
0.046

B. Firm distribution by industry
Industry# - Industry Name
36 – Computer Software

26

4,162

0.624

37 – Electronic Equipment

18

3,919

0.459

44 – Restaurants, Hotels and Motels

14

1,447

0.967

13 – Pharmaceutical Products

10

1,863

0.536

9

1,374

0.655

14 – Chemicals
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Figure 2.1: Put Option Sample firms
** Put Option Sales data is provided by Dr. Jenter

2.4 Analysis and Results
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 2.2 reports firm characteristics of firms selling put options and average of top 3
matching firms based on Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002 methodology. Table 2.3 reports
similar data but comparing put selling sample to all firm CCM. On average the put selling firms
are much bigger than the matching firms and CCM firms. For example average size as measured
by market capitalization for POS firms is $20B, for matching firms its $9.5B and for all CCM
firms its $3B. Put issuers have much higher book equity and market to book ratio as compared
to matching firms (slightly behind) and CCM firms (far behind), indicating that these firms are
growing much faster than and bigger in size at the same time.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Matching firms
This table presents the Univariate characteristics for put selling firms during the 1991 to 2004 sample period compared to matching firms (top 3) in the same time period
based on industry (Fama French 49 industries), then on ranking quintiles of smallest absolute difference of size (market cap), and smallest absolute difference of market
to book based on Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002. From CCM we get total assets (AT, in $mln.), total common equity (CEQ, in $mln.), cash (CHE, in $mln.), income
before extraordinary items (IB, in $mln.), capital expenditure (CAPX, in $mln.), common shares outstanding (CSHO, in mln.), size (PRCC_F * CSHO), book equity
(AT-LT-PSTKL+TXDITC+DCVT), market-to-book ((AT – book equity + size)/AT), R & D (XRD, $mln.), sales (SALE, in $mln.), ROA (NI / lag(AT)), ROE (NI /
lag(CEQ)), stock return ((PRCC_F / lag(PRCC_F)) -1), and book leverage ((1-(CEQ/AT)).
Sample firms

Financial characteristics
Total Assets (AT)
Total Equity (CEQ)
Cash (CHE)
Income Before Ext. Items (IB)
Capital Expenditure (CAPX)
Shares Outstanding (CSHO)
Size
Book Equity
Market to Book
R&D
Sales
ROA
ROE
Stock Return
Book Leverage

Mean

Median

35,108.00
4,700.00
5,476.00
1,004.00
639.00
385.00
20,456.00
5,106.00
2.95
266.00
8,660.00
0.12
0.33
0.06
0.55

2,917.00
1,131.00
308.00
226.00
157.00
153.00
5,737.00
1,257.00
2.13
33.00
2,383.00
0.09
0.20
0.007
0.54

Matching firms
SD

Mean

11,7807.00
8,562.00
21,016.00
1,745.00
976.00
567.00
37,394.00
8,808.00
2.39
646.00
13,222.00
0.12
0.76
0.44
0.22

30,629.00
2,852.00
4,370.00
487.00
301.00
226.00
9,582.00
3,150.00
2.75
135.00
6,160.00
0.26
0.47
0.58
0.51
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Median
1,770.00
808.00
138.00
125.00
86.00
90.00
3,137.00
852.00
2.02
3.5
1,602.00
0.09
0.19
0.03
0.50

Difference
SD
117,055.00
5,717.00
23,331.00
828.00
569.00
412.00
18,283.00
6,231.00
2.65
515.00
11,162.00
4.57
6.77
4.98
0.22

Mean
4.00***
3.66***
3.68***
5.52***
4.53***
4.39***
4.47***
3.78***
1.20
2.76***
3.79***
1.49*
1.98**
-1.21
1.45*

Median
2.69***
3.05**
3.76
4.11***
2.27**
2.87***
3.40***
2.52***
0.91
1.62*
2.34***
0.65
1.18
-0.96
1.45**

Table 2.3: Summary Statistics of Sample firms
This table presents the Univariate characteristics for put selling firms during the 1991 to 2004 sample period compared to CCM firms in the same time period. From
CCM we get total assets (AT, in $mln.), total common equity (CEQ, in $mln.), cash (CHE, in $mln.), income before extraordinary items (IB, in $mln.), capital
expenditure (CAPX, in $mln.), common shares outstanding (CSHO, in mln.), size (PRCC_F * CSHO), book equity (AT-LT-PSTKL+TXDITC+DCVT), market-to-book
((AT – book equity + size)/AT), R & D (XRD, $mln.), sales (SALE, in $mln.), ROA (NI / lag(AT)), ROE (NI / lag(CEQ)), stock return ((PRCC_F / lag(PRCC_F)) -1),
and book leverage ((1-(CEQ/AT)).
Sample firms

Financial characteristics
Total Assets (AT)
Total Equity (CEQ)
Cash (CHE)
Income Before Ext. Items (IB)
Capital Expenditure (CAPX)
Shares Outstanding (CSHO)
Size
Book Equity
Market to Book
R&D
Sales
ROA
ROE
Stock Return
Book Leverage

Mean

Median

35,108.00
4,700.00
5,476.00
1,004.00
639.00
385.00
20,456.00
5,106.00
2.95
266.00
8,660.00
0.12
0.33
0.06
0.55

2,917.00
1,131.00
308.00
226.00
157.00
153.00
5,737.00
1,257.00
2.13
33.00
2,383.00
0.09
0.20
0.007
0.54

CCM firms
SD

Mean

11,7807.00
8,562.00
21,016.00
1,745.00
976.00
567.00
37,394.00
8,808.00
2.39
646.00
13,222.00
0.12
0.76
0.44
0.22

6,692.00
1,132.00
671.00
170.00
176.00
86.00
3,070.00
1,317.00
1.84
40.00
2,318.00
0.16
0.46
0.40
0.55
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Median
379.00
129.00
23.00
14.00
10.00
16.00
266.00
139.00
1.26
0.00
211.00
0.05
0.13
0.04
0.56

Difference
SD
53,527.00
4,753.00
8,154.00
828.00
929.00
335.00
13,642.00
5,539.00
2.72
316.00
10,203.00
2.61
9.58
6.76
0.25

Mean

Median

13.47***
14.89***
13.11***
16.56***
14.38***
16.32***
16.88***
14.99***
10.38***
10.01***
15.27***
7.99***
8.58***
-1.10
-0.49

11.58***
14.90***
10.19***
12.82***
14.38***
16.31***
16.88***
14.99***
10.37***
10.01***
15.26***
7.99***
8.58***
-1.10
-0.50

Table 2.4: Univariate analysis: Earnings Quality
This table reports the results of summary statistics for EQ1 and EQ2 (both using modified Jones model). EQ1 is the
absolute abnormal total accruals and EQ2 is the absolute abnormal current accruals. The detailed descriptions of the
calculation for both measures are reported in Data and Methodology section of the paper. Panel A reports the total
firms from CCM which have observations to calculate earnings quality. There are total 74898 firm year
observations to both EQ1 and EQ2 are calculated. Panel B is subset of POS firms where there are 364 firm year
observations. Panel C are the top 3 matching firms based on Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002.
Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Q1

Q2

Univariate: EQ1

0.105

0.0657

0.178

0.03

0.123

Univariate: EQ2

0.075

0.039

0.118

Univariate: EQ1

0.089

0.067

0.086

0.036

0.115

Univariate: EQ2

0.049

0.029

0.066

0.012

0.061

Univariate: EQ1

0.092

0.066

0.105

0.036

0.112

Univariate: EQ2

0.054

0.031

0.077

0.013

0.063

Test / Measure
Panel A: All firms in CCM
Size (74898 firm years)

Panel B: POS Firms
Size (364 firm years)

Panel C: POS Matching Firms
Size (1092 firm years)
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2.4.2 Univariate Analysis

Table 2.4 reports Univariate test results of the two main measures of earning quality (EQ1
and EQ2) for all CCM firms (Panel A), POS firms (Panel B), and average of top 3 matching
firms (Panel C). Both EQ1 and EQ2 earnings quality measures for the put selling firms (EQ1 =
0.89 and EQ2 = 0.049) are lower when compared to matching firms (EQ1 = 0.92 and EQ2 =
0.054) and similarly much lower when compared to all firms in CCM. This lower value of the
measure indicated High Earnings Quality of the POS firms, thus supporting our main proposition
that put selling firms by exhibiting high earnings quality support market timing as the main
motive for the selling of these options.
Table 2.5 shows some preliminary results indicating that quality of the earning in the quarter
immediately following the quarter in which puts were sold are decreasing this observations
consistent with Rangan (1998), but it need further evaluation by increasing the number of
quarters the analysis is performed around the event from (-4 to +3).

52

Table 2.5: Earnings Quality: Quarterly
This table reports the results of summary statistics for EQ1 calculated quarterly (using modified Jones model). EQ1
is the absolute abnormal total accruals. The detailed descriptions of the calculation for both measures are reported in
Data and Methodology section of the paper. Panel A reports mean and median EQ1 observations for Quarter 0
(quarter in which firm sold put options) and Quarter 1 is the immediate following quarter.

Mean

Median

Univariate: EQ1 – Quarter 0

0.0417

0.268

Univariate: EQ1 – Quarter 1

0.0436

0.261

Test / Measure

Panel A: POS Firms
Size (1483 firm years)

2.4.3 Market timing Analysis
Table 2.6 reports the final analysis and results using RIM. VP0 is calculated based on
estimating the present value and dividing it by current market price of the stock as discussed in
the data and methodology section. Panel A results show that POS sample mean VP0 is 0.75 as
compared to 0.72 for top 3 matching firms and Wilcoxon test shows the z-value of -2.03 is
significant at 5% level. This indicates that POS firms are undervalued as compared to matching
firms. The median adjusted VP0 as measured by log((1-median)+mean) results in 0.239 for
sample firms and 0.1397 clearly indicating that POS firms are undervalued as compared to
matching firm.
This is consistent with our earnings quality results, in both instances the results support our
hypothesis that market timing is the main motive for the firms selling put options and it is
consistent with the main findings of Jenter, Lewellen, and Warner (2011).
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Table 2.6: Market Timing: Residual Income Model
This table reports the results of Mispricing (VP0) which is measured as (EV0 / P0), where EV0 is firm’s equity at
time 0, and P0 is the market price at the end of the year. In calculating EV0, the cost of equity is calculated based
on 3 month T-bill and the procedure used in Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan, 1999 (LMS), and based on Fama and
French, 1997 using both 3 factors (FF3F) and one factor (FF1F). Sample independence of VP0 is determined by
using Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, additionally a t-test was also used for the sample independence. The values of
the Match firms (VP0) indicate the results by averaging the VP0 for 3 matching firms for each sample firm.
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.

Sample (VP0)
Test / Measure

Match (VP0)

t-test
(pooled)

(top match)

(p-value)

WilcoxonMann-Whitney
test
(p-value)

T = 0.24

Z = -2.03**

(0.8130)
T = 1.51
(.1300)

(0.0213)
Z=1.38*
(0.0834)

T = -0.80
(0.4231)

Z = 2.07**
(0.0193)

T = -0.48
(0.6322)

Z = 1.51*
(0.0662)

Panel A: Cost of Equity based
on LMS
Univariate: Size

672

672

Univariate: Mean

0.75

0.72 (.50)

Univariate: Median

0.48

0.57 (.45)

Panel B: Cost of Equity based
on FF3F
Univariate: Size

672

672

Univariate: Mean

0.42

0.44

Univariate: Median

0.36

0.36

Panel C: Cost of Equity based
on FF1F
Univariate: Size

672

672

Univariate: Mean

0.59

0.61

Univariate: Median

0.45

0.49
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(Top 3 Match
Avg)
(Top Match)

Table 2.7: Market Timing: Book Value
This table reports the results of book-to-value (bv0) which is measured as (AT_CSHO / EV0), where EV0 is firm’s
equity at time 0, and AT_CSHO total assets scaled to common shares outstanding. In calculating EV0, the cost of
equity is calculated based on 3 month T-bill and the procedure used in Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan, 1999 (LMS),
and based on Fama and French, 1997 using both 3 factors (FF3F) and one factor (FF1F). Sample independence of
VP0 is determined by using Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, additionally a t-test was also used for the sample
independence. The values of the Match firms (bv0) indicate the results by averaging the bv0 for 3 matching firms
for each sample firm. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.

Sample (bv0)
Test / Measure

Match (bv0)

t-test
(pooled)

(top match)

(p-value)

WilcoxonMann-Whitney
test
(p-value)

T = 1.75*

Z = 0.021

(0.080)
T = 0.29
(0.7719)

(0.4916)
Z=-0.31
(0.378)

T = -2.83**
(0.0047)

Z = -3.72***
(0.0001)

T = -0.62
(0.5367)

Z = -3.47***
(0.0003)

Panel A: Cost of Equity based
on LMS
Univariate: Size

672

672

Univariate: Mean

3.32

2.42 (2.96)

Univariate: Median

1.21

1.05 (1.08)

Panel B: Cost of Equity based
on FF3F
Univariate: Size

672

672

Univariate: Mean

2.84

5.78

Univariate: Median

1.66

1.90

Panel C: Cost of Equity based
on FF1F
Univariate: Size

672

672

Univariate: Mean

2.29

0.77

Univariate: Median

1.29

1.54
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(Top 3 Match
Avg)
(Top Match)

VP0 (Mispricing) was lower for sample firms as compared to match firms in two of the
methods (panel B and C: using FF3F and FF1F to calculate COE), it was higher in Panel A when
the COE was calculated using Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan. This leads to the conclusion that
Match firm were more mispriced as compared to sample firms who are selling put options in at
least two of the three methods used to calculate COE.
The main hypothesis was that the firms selling put options are relatively more mispriced
(undervalued) as compared to matching firms. This is supported in Panel A where the COE was
calculated based on LMS method and more so when the matching firm was the top matching
firm as compared to average of top 3 firms. An additional issue was that value of VP0 (range:
.75 to .42) for different methods is very low and you were mentioning that it should be close to 1.
I ran additional test to validate my coding to make sure I am calculating things correctly. These
results are shown in the last page of the document in Table 7. VP0 for S&P 500 large companies
is .90 indicating my code does not have major problems. In addition when ran the same code for
same sample but extending the time frame to 2008, VP0 dropped to .71 thus indicating these is
time varying effect.
Table 2.7 shows bv0 (Book-to-Value) representing growth opportunities.

Similar panels

were run as in table 3. In panel A, the sample bv0 is higher than the match firms indicating the
sample firms have higher growth opportunities. Panel C was consistent with A, but Panel B
reversed.
Table 2.7 shows the results of repurchase calculations for the sample and match firms. Since
the POS firms are doing it along with repurchases, the sample firms should be having higher
repurchase activity (higher –ve numbers). The results in the table are consistent with this except
for the mean repurchased in t0 year.
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2.5

Conclusion
Our results show that due to information asymmetry, managers can profit by timing the

market based on the knowledge of earnings quality level (low/high), thus effectively timing the
market in case of firms selling put options. The market timing explanation for the put selling
activity is further affirmed by using the best available valuation model RIM. This additional
result show that put selling firms on average are relatively undervalued as compared to similar
matching firms.
Preliminary results using quarterly earnings quality analysis (EQ1) shows that there is an
increase in absolute value of EQ1 from 0.0417 to 0.0436, indicating the earnings quality
decreased in the quarter immediately following quarter in which put options were sold. We need
to further investigate additional quarters (-4 to +3) before and after the put sale for each firm to
further understand if the managers are maintaining high earnings quality just when they decide to
engage in put selling activity or if is persistent sustainable phenomena.
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Chapter 3: Earnings Quality: A case of Hedging Strategies by US Airlines

Historically jet fuel prices have fluctuated heavily, specifically over the past few years
which significantly affected the US Airlines ability to maintain consistent positive cash flows.
The companies used several hedging and abnormal hedging strategies to navigate these volatile
periods. We analyze these strategies employed by dichotomizing them into pure hedge positions
and abnormal hedging positions and calculate the effect around implementing FASB #133 /
IASB #39 on firm value among other variables in each case and identify behaviors leading to
these decisions.

3.1

Introduction
Historically Crude Oil prices have been highly volatile due to the supply limitations and

demand explosion as the world economies are growing. A large component of the airline
industry cost structure is jet fuel. A recent article in the Wall Street Journal describes the
difficulties faced by the airline industry due to a steep rise in oil prices to $147 per barrel in mid
2008 and the subsequent steep drop due to the financial crisis to around $40 per barrel in early
2009. For many years the fluctuation in jet fuel prices has created cash flow problems. For
airlines, fuel cost is the second largest operating expense, increasing from about 13% in 2003 to
about 29.4% in 2009; a 125% increase. Since over-the counter derivatives on jet fuel are very
illiquid and expensive, airlines generally use the more liquid futures on crude.
FCIC (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission) hearing considers modifying
regulations related to hedging as a part of broader financial regulations. This research provides
an insight into potential effects of these regulations on companies.
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The main goal of this paper is to analyze the before and after effects of implementing
FASB #133 and the related IASB #39 regulation regarding hedging activities on the Firm Value.
Companies using derivatives as part of their day to day strategy are significantly affected by this
regulation. Airlines use derivatives (options, futures and swaps) to hedge against variation
caused by the fluctuation in crude oil prices as on average 15-20% of their operating expenses
are due to purchase of the fuel. We propose that an increase in firm value after change in
regulations will allow airlines to reduce their hedging activity which is not their core business.
FASB #1334 was made mandatory for the firms using any kind of buying and selling
derivatives in 2000.

Before the regulation, companies reported hedging activities on their

income statement when they actually exercised them; that created higher volatility in net cash
flow depending on the loss or gain from closing hedging position. The regulation requires
companies to report the fair value of the derivatives on their balance sheet on an ongoing basis,
thus potentially reducing volatility on the income statement.
Our research extends literature by analyzing the dichotomy of normal hedging versus
abnormal hedging by the airline industry and the effect on the firms’ value during the special
periods when new regulations affecting the industry are implemented; the prices are volatile, as
in the current financial crisis. Based on prior literature, we use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm
value.
Typical hedging strategies used by airlines range from 0% hedging to 100% hedging in
static and dynamic time periods, using combination of derivatives (e.g. selling 12-month forward
futures, selective 3-month forward futures, selling forward in backwardized markets, puts,

4

“FASB require companies to measure some assets and liabilities on their balance sheet at “fair value”. This
standard was created in response to significant hedging losses involving derivatives years ago and the attempt to
control and manage corporate hedging as risk management not earnings management.”
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selling options, bear spread, straddle, strangle, collars and hedging by condition: backwardized
and contango markets).
Froot et al. (1993) developed a theoretical explanation for hedging. They suggest that
firm’s investment opportunities are valuable; the firm uses derivatives to increase their ability to
fund investments during peaks in input prices.
Typically, firms hedge to reduce the volatility or variance of a firm value by either
increasing the expected future cash flows or reducing the risk.

Some firms use hedging

derivative positions for abnormal purposes beyond risk management to enhance future cash
flows instead of merely smoothing their cash flows. We explore the temporal variation in the
use of crude oil derivatives by airlines around new regulation implementation.

In theory,

hedging attempts to lower uncertainty around future price and thereby smooth earnings.
Abnormal hedging involves taking a position with expectation that the price will move in a
particular direction, and possibly increase the volatility of earnings. The airline industry claims
to prefer hedging and not abnormal hedging. For example:
United Airlines purchased fuel caps averaging around $111 per barrel for 2008 and $118
for 2009; given the precipitous fall in oil prices they will be paying more for oil than the market
price, due to the established contracts. Is this just bad timing or abnormal hedging? Southwest
continuously hedges and considers it as their fiduciary responsibility. According to Reuter’s
article on March 2008, United Airlines hedged 15% of 1Q 2008 fuel needs, Continental 20%,
Delta 26%, Northwest 18%, Southwest 75%, and American 24% which is only year-over-year
increase for the above airlines.
There has been a significant amount of research across many industries regarding the
consequences of different hedging strategies to firm value. Specifically Allayannis and Weston
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(2001) show that hedging is positively related to the firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q value,
and that a very significant percentage of the benefits from hedging occur due to reduction in
underinvestment. Carter et al. (2006) show that hedging activities add value to a firm, and also
identify and quantify sources of these benefits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the prior literature,
Section 3 describes the data and methodology, Section 4 describes the analysis and presents the
results, and Section 5 offers conclusions.

3.2

Literature

In general firms manage their strategic risk, operational risk, and financial risk. Shareholder
value maximization hypothesis concludes that firms engage in risk management activities like
hedging to reduce costs of financial distress, to reduce taxes, and to minimize underinvestment
scenarios.

Whereas, Managerial risk aversion hypothesis states that managers will try to

maximize their wealth using risk management strategies if their interests are not directly aligned
with that of shareholders.
Allayannis and Weston (2001) show that “airlines hedge primarily to reduce costs of
financial distress and underinvestment”. They also show that there is a positive relationship
between currency derivatives and relative market value of the firms. Froot et al. (1993) show
how hedging can create consistent cash flows under financial constraints, these internal funds
can enhance firm value by eliminating underinvestment problem.
Lin et al. (2008) show main theories based on investor’s decisions in relation to hedging
and leverage (financial distress costs), hedging and investment (underinvestment issues),
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investment and leverage (agency issues related to capital structure). They conclude that all the
above combinations provide mixed support for Modigliani and Miller (1958) irrelevance theory.
They conclude that if all three decisions are taken together there is a positive relationship
between hedging and leverage in the absence of agency issues, specifically between debt and
hedging even in the absence of tax benefits. Ross (1996) has similar results but he explains them
by tax benefits as the main reason.
Carter et al. (2006) show effect on firm value due to individual hedging policy in an
investment and financing scenarios; they use Froot et al. (1993) results stating that “costly
external financing is a market imperfection that makes hedging a value-enhancing strategy”. The
airline industry is a good candidate for the underinvestment rationale for hedging.

An

underinvestment problem occurs when the external financing becomes relatively expensive and
the internal funds availability is not enough to undertake positive NPV projects. In this scenario,
firms either reduce investing in the profitable projects or undertake risk management strategies
like hedging to ensure that the funds are available to engage in positive NPV projects.

3.2.1 Hedging in airline industry
Pulvino (1998, 1999) show that “airlines face significant distress costs and the financially
stronger airlines can buy aircraft at discounted prices”. Kim and Singal (1993) show that the
above scenario leads to a higher price charged by the airlines. Airlines can hedge to avoid
selling their assets at bargain prices, thus reducing expected financial distress as mentioned by
Smith and Stulz (1985).
Weiss and Maher (2008) show that airlines are effectively using operational hedging
strategies like fleet diversity and fuel efficient fleet along with derivatives to manage the impact
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of volatility in jet fuel prices, but using financial instruments proved to be less effective when
compared to operational hedging.

3.2.2 Disclosure and Firm Value
Research shows that disclosure is positively related to the financial leverage, and current
capital structure, specifically debt levels (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Lang and Lundholm
(1993) and Miller (2002) show that higher disclosure is positively and significantly related to
higher firm value and better performance.

3.3

Data and Methodology

Data was collected for airline industry (SIC code 4512) with available financial data in
the COMPUSTAT database as of December 2008, and Value Line reports. We also collected
data on revenues, available seat miles (ASM), market share, firm size and other metrics to
calculate airline hedging performance.
Hedging fuel expense related data has been collected from the airline industry firms’ 10K statements filed with SEC. Fiscal year-end is defined as calendar year in which a firm has fuel
hedges in place; in addition maximum maturity of the hedge in years, and percentage of next
year’s fuel requirements hedged was collected as described by Carter et al. (2006). The data was
collected around historical oil peaks, occurred between the sample periods 2000-2008.
First we identify determinants of hedging using regression analysis, with % of next year’s
fuel requirement as Dependent Variable and various financial ratios as Independent Variables as
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described by Carter et al. (2006). Next we calculate effect of hedging on firm value by testing
the relationship between Tobin’s Q used as proxy for firm value, and fuel hedging as described
by Allayannis and Weston (2001). In the second regression analysis Tobin’s Q is used as
Dependent Variable and other financial ratios including the % fuel hedged as Independent
Variables. We use normal hedging and abnormal hedging as interaction variables. This part of
the analysis provides insight into how a firm value is affected by type of hedging used by the
firm.
We expect that the normal hedging firms will increase their firm value consistent with the
existing literature whereas abnormal hedging firms will show a decrease in a firm value,
specifically in the sample after FASB / IASB regulations came into effect. We have defined two
ways to distinguish the normal vs. abnormal hedging variable in Section C (Data) of Data and
Methodology.

3.3.1 How airlines calculating Hedge Ratios
Airlines use variety of hedging strategies using derivatives to fully hedge or to
completely not hedge their fuel requirements.

The airlines come up with the hedge ratio they

need to use for risk management by typically selling jet fuel and buying futures contracts; one
method they use is to calculate the change in value of the hedge position for the contract duration
based on Hull (2000).

–(

)

(1)
(2)
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- Correlation between spot jet fuel price and selected future contract
- Standard deviation of contract5

The hedge ratio can also be derived by regressing jet fuel as Dependent Variable and contracts as
Independent Variable.6 Airlines which are not hedging will assume the risk of volatility of fuel
prices. Some of them will use fuel pass-through agreements or charter agreements, where they
pass the fuel costs back to the codeshare partner or share a percentage loss by reimbursing or
getting back a percentage from the gains with a pre agreed cap on the proceeds.

3.3.2 Accounting Artifacts related to FASB #133 / IASB #39
Hedging airlines typically have a short position in jet fuel and purchase it in the future
based on real consumption, this is called “cash flow hedge of a forecasted transaction” by the
FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board) statement #133 as of fiscal year 2000.
Derivative purchases must use mark-to-market accounting and be disclosed in a balance sheet.
The corresponding journal entry is booked to an “Other Comprehensive Income” account thus
directly booked to retained earnings; these entries are finally released in income statement as the
transactions happen. The goal is to carry derivatives at market value on a balance sheet without
introducing volatility to the income statement using retained earnings account.

5

Equations (1) and (2) are derived from a working paper by Richard Cobbs and Alex Wolf, 2004 article “Jet fuel
hedging strategies: Options available for airlines and a survey of industry practices.
6 “AMR assesses, both at the inception of each hedge and on an on-going basis, whether the derivatives that are
used in its hedging transactions are highly effective in offsetting changes in cash flows of the hedged items. In doing
so, the Company uses a regression model to determine the correlation of the change in prices of the commodities
used to hedge jet fuel (e.g. NYMEX Heating oil) to the change in the price of jet fuel. The Company also monitors
the actual dollar offset of the hedges’ market values as compared to hypothetical jet fuel hedges. The fuel hedge
contracts are generally deemed to be “highly effective” if the R-squared is greater than 80 percent and the dollar
offset correlation is within 80 percent to 125 percent. The Company discontinues hedge accounting prospectively if
it determines that a derivative is no longer expected to be highly effective as a hedge or if it decides to discontinue
the hedging relationship.”
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If the forecasts fall short due to over hedging the airline can introduce volatility in the
income statements in terms of cash flows falling short. To avoid this uncertainty, airlines
commonly do not hedge 100% and will use hedging only up to a level they need for sure, and
leave the remaining fuel consumption unhedged. The industry leader Southwest hedges about
75% of their fuel requirements based on the minimum expected use of the fuel they need for next
year.

3.3.3 Data
Data on the jet fuel usage and related hedging activities, fuel pass-through agreements,
and charter agreements is collected for 10 airline firms, and to be expanded to the other airlines,
which are listed in US and file with SEC. In total 72 firm years’ data of hedging activities of the
9 airline firms was used in this research (one firm Frontier Airline has to be deleted as it filed for
bankruptcy in 2008, and thus the data is not available for the recent periods). This data is
collected manually from the 10-K filings from MERGENT electronic database interface to
EDGARS filing website.
The information is available under “ITEM 7(A).QUANTITATIVE AND
QUALITATIVE DISCLOSURES ABOUT MARKET RISK” as mandated by FASB statement
#133 (“Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities”). All of the firms also
should be represented in Compustat database between 2000-2008 calendar years and covered by
Value Line during the same period, in order to augment the financial data and to collect an
expected operating margin which is used in determining the abnormal hedging intent of the
hedging programs of the firms.
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Table 3.1: Sample
Sample hedging data for SIC codes 4512 and 4513, collected from SEC 10-K filings. Under the new accounting re
FASB #133, as of 1/1/2001 all companies have to report the fair value of underlying financial instruments used for
risk management. None of the firms in the sample used fuel pass through agreement or charter operations, some of
the smaller airlines use these contracts which will affect their level of hedging strategies.
Years Jet Fuel
Hedged

Airline

Jet fuel as a %
of Operating
Expenses

Average %
of Next Year
Hedged

Std. Dev of
Next year
Hedged

Fuel Passthrough
Agreement

Charter
Operations

AirTran

18.84%

2000-2008

Alaska Air

13.92%

2001-2008

29%

8

0

0

36%

16

0

American

11.97%

0

2000-2008

23%

12

0

Continental

0

15.14%

2000-2008

13%

13

0

0

Delta Air

12.20%

2000-2008

37%

23

0

0

Frontier Airlines

15.58%

2002-2008

17%

15

0

0

JetBlue Airlines

16.07%

2002-2008

22%

17

0

0

Southwest Airlines

14.51%

2000-2008

69%

28

0

0

United Airlines

12.30%

2000-2008

10%

12

0

0

US Airways

9.69%

2000-2008

23%

17

0

0

Average

14.02%7

28%

The data in the Table 3.1 is based on the Carter (2006); this data is used to determine the
hedge ratio by calculating and recording % of jet fuel requirement for year (t+1) (denoted as HR
in the data set). The hedging data is collected over a period of time from 2000 to 2008. The fuel
pass-through agreement and charter operations variables have a value of 1 if there is an
agreement and 0 otherwise.
The average of “Average % of Next Year Hedged” column is 28%, this indicates that
over the sample of 72 firm-years (9 firms * 8 sample years) the identified airlines hedged 28% of
their next year’s fuel requirement. This sample is further reduced to 59, due to unavailability of
data in Value Line reports for some firms’ due to external factors like bankruptcy filings.
Column four in Table 1 represents Standard Deviation of the previous variable for each firm over
the 8 year period. Additional data will be added to this sample to increase the statistical power

7

Carter et al. (2006)
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of the analysis. We propose one way to identify abnormal hedging activities by identifying if a
particular firm is increasing or decreasing next year’s % of fuel hedged beyond the
(mean+(1*standard deviation)). This is represented by a dummy variable as H_S = 1 for
abnormal hedging, and H_S = 0 for normal hedge situation in the data set
Value Line is used to collect the data for the expected Operating Margin for next year
(t+1) variable. Next year expected Operating Margin (EOM) increase is compared to the % of
jet fuel hedged, if the EOM increased from t to t+1 years, and correspondingly the % of jet fuel
hedged increases, it is considered as normal hedge, in the alternate scenario, it is considered as
abnormal hedging (denoted as H_S_VL =1 as abnormal hedging, 0 as normal hedging in the data
set).
Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics of the data we collected form 10-K filings and
COMPUSTAT for the sample firms. Hedging related H_S variable shows that firms speculate in
about 27% of times (abnormal hedging), whereas H_S_VL indicates that firms speculate in about
32% of times.

Tobin’s Q, LT Debt-to-asset ratio, and ln (Assets) are used as Independent

Variables to test whether these financial constraints measures are useful in explaining why firms
hedge.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for sample data for SIC code 4512, collected form SEC 10-K filings, Compustat and Value Line.
N

Mean

Std.

Quartile1

Median

Tobin’s Q (Firm Value Proxy)

59

0.488

0.514

0.122

0.272

0.874

LT debt- to Assets

59

0.326

0.151

0.232

0.331

0.456

Cash Flow-to-Sales

59

0.109

0.088

0.494

0.091

0.145

Cash-to-Sales

59

0.135

0.122

0.058

0.113

0.162

Tax Loss Carry Forward

59

-14.301

417.610

-0.600

6.700

167.590

Dividend Index (1=yes; 0=no)

59

0.322

0.471

0

0

Altman’s Z Score

59

1.222

1.041

0.261

1.044

Hedge Ratio(% of t+1 years fuel hedged)

59

30.309

24.016

14

24

40

Hedge or Abnormal hedging (H_S)

59

0.288

0.457

0

0

1

Hedge or Abnormal hedging ( H_S_VL)

59

0.322

0.471

0

0

L T debt-to-Assets

59

8.809

1.247

7.937

9.189

3.4

Quartile3

1
1.930

1
9.938

Analysis and Results
The following hypotheses are proposed to test firm value and related performance around

the adoption of FASB / IASB regulations related to derivatives hedging:

H1: Firm value decreases due to abnormal hedging after implementing FASB #133 / IASB #39
H2: Firm value increases due to normal hedging after implementing FASB #133 / IASB #39

First, we test determinants of jet fuel hedging by airlines using regression analysis:
Model 1 (OLS):
% of Next year’s fuel requirements hedged = the independent variables in Table 3.3
Model 2 (Logit):
H_S (0/1) = the independent variables in Table 3.3
Model 3 (Logit):
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H_S_VL (0/1) = the independent variables in Table 3.3
Model 4 (corrected Model 1 for Heteroscedasticity):
% of Next year’s fuel requirements hedged = the independent variables in Table 3.3

Table 3.3: Determinants of hedging fuel
This table reports the results of regressions explaining the hedging of t+1 year fuel requirements by sample airlines
between the years 2000-2008. Model 1 shows the effect of different Independent Variables shown in the table on
the Dependent Variable HR (% of t+1 year fuel requirement). Model 2 and 3shows the effect of different
Independent Variables on the Dependent Variable H_S and H_S_VL respectively. Model 4 repeats the Model 1
using White matrix to correct for Heteroscedasticity in the data. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Variable

(p-value)

(p-value)

(p-value)

(White matrix)

Intercept

Observations used

-3.344
(0.90)
28.872***
(0.00)
-48.751**
(0.02)
63.057
(0.14)
-30.937
(0.26)
-0.007
(0.28)
-4.310
(0.60)
3.875
(0.16)
59

5.796
(0.19)
0.636
(0.66)
-7.523**
(0.02)
-6.157
(0.34)
-6.910
(0.13)
-0.001
(0.85)
1.340
(0.35)
-0.139
(0.74)
59

2.756
(0.41)
0.683
(0.46)
-0.643
(0.79)
-4.462
(0.37)
-0.587
(0.86)
-0.000
(0.57)
-0.488
(0.60)
-0.155
(0.64)
59

R-square

0.475***

55.753

70.711

Tobin’s Q
LT debt-to-assets
Cash Flow-to-Sales
Cash-to-Sales
Tax Loss Carry Forward
Dividend Indicator
Ln(Total Assets)

28.872***

59

(0.00)
Adj. R-square
Log likelihood

0.403

The results form Table 3.3 show that in Model 1, Tobin’s Q is positively and
significantly related to hedging, which explains increase in hedging by firms with higher value.
The variable LT debt-to-assets which identifies debt capacity of a firm is negatively correlated to
hedging; indicating that as the debt capacity of a firm decreases the firm tends to increase their
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hedging activity. A tax variable, Tax Loss Carry Forward, shows no relationship with hedging
activity.
These results are all directionally consistent across Model 1 (continuously hedge
variable), Model 2 (abnormal hedging variable), and Model 3 (abnormal hedging variable based
on Value Line estimates) for Tobin’s Q, LT debt-to-assets, Cash-to-Sales and Tax Loss Carry
Forward variables indicating that none of these variables were influential in the firm’s decision
regarding weather to hedge normally or abnormally.
The second test shows effect of various hedging strategies and behaviors on firm value
around the FASB / IASB regulation as measure by Tobin’s Q:
Model 1 (OLS):
Tobin’s Q = the independent variables in Table 3.4, with HR
Model 2 (Logit):
Tobin’s Q = the independent variables in Table 3.4, with H_S (0/1)
Model 3 (Logit):
Tobin’s Q = the independent variables in Table 3.4, with H_S_VL (0/1)
Model 4 (corrected model1 for Heteroscedasticity):
Tobin’s Q = the independent variables in Table 3.4
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Table 3.4: Fuel hedging around regulation
This table reports the results of regressions explaining the value of normal hedging and abnormal hedging activities
of jet fuel by sample airlines between years 2000-2008. Model 1 shows the effect of different Independent
Variables shown in the table on the Dependent Variable ln (Tobin’s Q) used as proxy for Firm Value. Model 2
(H_S) and Model 3(H_S_VL) shows the effect of different Independent Variables on the Dependent Variable ln
(Tobin’s Q). Model 4 repeats the Model 1 using White matrix to correct for Heteroscedasticity in the data.
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Variable

(p-value)

(p-value)

(p-value)

(White matrix)

Intercept

Observations used

-0.626
(0.49)
0.027***
(0.00)
2.623***
(0.00)
6.760***
(0.00)
1.437
(0.14)
0.001***
(0.00)
-0.414
(0.16)
-0.346***
(0.00)
59

0.284
(081)
-0.192
(0.50)
1.579
(0.12)
7.960***
(0.00)
1.523
(0.24)
0.000**
(0.01)
0.384
(0.34)
0.117***
(0.00)
59

0.260
(0.82)
-0.328
(0.19)
1.403
(0.14)
8.082***
(0.00)
1.360
(0.29)
0.000**
(0.02)
-0.322
(0.38)
-0.339***
(0.00)
59

R-square

0.890***

0.673***

0.681***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.786

0.628

0.637

Hedging (HR; H_S; H_S_VL)
LT debt-to-assets
Cash Flow-to-Sales
Cash-to-Sales
Tax Loss Carry Forward
Dividend Indicator
Ln(Total Assets)

Adj. R-square

0.027***
2.623**
6.760***

0.001***

59

Table 3.4 shows results of hedging jet fuel (both normal and abnormal hedging around
regulation implementation) on a firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. The results form Table
3.4 show that in Model 1 (normal hedging), the continuous hedge ratio variable HR is positively
and significantly related to Tobin’s Q, which explains that firm value increases as the hedge ratio
increases. In Model 2 (abnormal hedging) using binary hedge ratio variable HR_S, and Model 3
(abnormal hedging) using binary hedge ratio variable HR_S_VL are negatively and not
significantly related to Tobin’s Q, which explains that firm value increases as the hedge ratio
decreases. Model 2 and Model 3 are contradicting the results of Model 1 as related to the effect
of hedging on firm value, one way to explain this is when a firm uses abnormal hedging
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strategies they will result in decreased firm value; where else if a firm uses normal hedging
strategies they will result in an increase in firm value8.
These results are all directionally consistent across Model 1 (normal hedging variable),
Model 2 (abnormal hedging variable), and Model 3 (abnormal hedging variable based on Value
Line estimates) for all variables except for Hedge Ratio, Dividend Indicator, and ln (Total
Assets) indicating that these variables were influential on firm value irrespective of their hedging
strategies, whereas the other Independent Variables are not consistently related to the firm value
directionally.

8

One of the definitions of normal hedging Vs abnormal hedging is derived from KPMG position paper “Fuel
Hedging for the Commercial Airline Industry”, March 2008. They define Abnormal Hedging as “managing
dynamic hedge positions while attempting to generate additional profits”. While dynamic hedging is defined as “a
rolling-hedge strategy with an actively managed position based on market conditions and portfolio sensitivities”.
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3.5

Conclusion
H1: Firm value decreased by 19.2% (the 1st model) and 32.8% (the 2nd model) abnormal

hedging models but not statistically significant
H2: Firm value increased by 2.7 % (significant at 1%) due to normal hedging after
implementing FASB #133.
This is directionally consistent with Carter et al, (2006) who show that there is a 5%-10%
increase in firm value for the companies who hedge. Observed increase in a firm value for
normal hedging after implementing regulations shows that FASB / IASB regulations are
effective in reducing volatility in firms Cash Flows, thus reducing the overall need for hedging in
case of airlines.
One reason for our results could be that the data set is too small, towards fixing this issue
we plan to expand the data set to see if the decrease (3%-13%) is valid for normal hedging
activities after FASB #133 / IASB #39. The next step will be to collect 10 years of data prior to
1999, and perform our empirical testing on the full set of data for about 20 years along with 6
international airline data already collected, leading to a final set of 16 airlines. Econometric
model line Chow test can be used to test if there is a structural break in explaining performance
of the firm.
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Appendix

VARIABLES USED IN CALCULATING EARNINGS QUALITY
TAj,t
= ( CAj,t − CLj,t − CASH j,t + STDEBTj,t − DEPN j,t )
(Total Accruals for firm j and year t)
TCAj,t
= ( CAj,t − CLj,t − CASHj,t + STDEBTj,t)
(Total Current Accruals)
CFOj,t
(Cash Flow)

= NIBEj,t − TAj,t

CAj,t
CLj,t
CASHj,t
STDEBTj,t
DEPN j,t
NIBEj,t
REV j,t
PPEj,t

= firm j’s change in current assets (Compustat #4) in year t,
= firm j’s change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) in year t,
= firm j’s change in cash (Compustat #1) in year t,
= firm j’s change in short-term debt (Compustat #34) in year t,
= firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat #14) in year t, and
= firm j’s net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18) in year t.
= firm j’s change in revenues (Compustat #12) in year t,
= firm j’s gross value of property, plant, and equipment (Compustat #7) in year t,
deflated by firm j’s total assets in year t−1 (Assetsj,t−1, Compustat #6).
= firm j’s change in accounts receivable (Compustat #2) in year t.

ARj,t
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EARNINGS QUALITY PROXIES, DECHOW, GE, AND SCHRAND (2009)
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PUT OPTION SALES DATA VARIABLES, DIRK JENTER
company
ticker
filtype
docdate
fildate
fyend
fq
fpend
permno
cfacpr
cfacshr
initiat
grntnum
Link
grntdatl
grntdath

grntd
issnum

xiss
proc

xpro
issface

xface
isstra
isstrl
isstrh
isexpl
isexph

issld

isshd

outnum
outface
outstra

Company name
Ticker symbol
Type of filing: 10-k or 10-q
Date of the document
Date the document was filed with the SEC
Calendar year in which the fiscal year ends
Fiscal quarter
End of fiscal period (quarter)
CRSP perm number
CRSP adjustment factor
CRSP adjustment factor
Dummy for put option program initiation
Numbers the put sales in this quarter
Attempt to link (by hand) put sales to subsequent put exercises and expirations. See
Link1 and Link2 in the exercise and expiration sections
Put sale date - lower bound
Put sale date - upper boud
Modifier to the two put sale date variables: If missing, then the two put sale date
variables refer to a month (hence 4/1/2000 means April 2000, NOT the 1st of April
2000). If 1, then the two put sale date variables refer to an exact date (i.e., 4/1/2000
actually means April 1, 2000).
Number of puts sold
Indicator for whether the put sale described by issnum can be pinpointed to a single
quarter or not. If more than one quarter has the same xiss number, then the given
number of puts was sold in the these quarters combined. Such quarters are also
marked by yellow shading.
Proceeds from the put sale.
Indicator for whether the put sale described by proc can be pinpointed to a single
quarter or not. If more than one quarter has the same xpro number, then the given
proceeds were earned in the these quarters combined. Such quarters are also marked
by yellow shading.
Face value of the puts sold.
Indicator for whether the put face value described by issface can be pinpointed to a
single quarter or not. If more than one quarter has the same xface number, then the
given face value was sold in the these quarters combined. Such quarters are also
marked by yellow shading.
Average strike price of puts sold
Lower bound on strike price of puts sold
Upper bound on strike price of puts sold
Expiration date of puts sold - lower bound
Expiration date of puts sold - upper bound
Indicator for how precisely we know the lower and upper bound expiration dates (isexpl
and isexph): If indicator missing, we only know the month. If indicator = 1, it is a precise
date. If indicator=2, we only know the quarter. If indicator=3, we only know the year.
Indicator for how precisely we know the lower and upper bound expiration dates (isexpl
and isexph): If indicator missing, we only know the month. If indicator = 1, it is a precise
date. If indicator=2, we only know the quarter. If indicator=3, we only know the year.
Number of puts outstanding at end of quarter. If 9999, we know that puts are
outstanding, but don't know the number. If 8888, we suspect that puts are outstanding,
but don't know for sure.
Face value of the puts outstanding at end of quarter.
Average strike price of puts oustanding.
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outstrl
outstrh
outexpl
outexph
outld
outhd
undeter
Link1
Link2
exenum

Xexe
setnum

xset
execost

Xexecost
exeface

xexeface
exestra
exestrl
exestrh
exedatl
exedath
exeld
exehd
expnum

xexp
extnum

Xext
expface
xexpface

Lower bound on strike price of puts oustanding.
Upper bound on strike price of puts oustanding.
Expiration date of puts outstanding - lower bound.
Expiration date of puts outstanding - upper bound.
Indicator for how precisely we know the lower and upper bound expiration dates (outld
and outhd). See above.
Indicator for how precisely we know the lower and upper bound expiration dates (outld
and outhd). See above.
Indicator for situations in which we know that puts were either exercised or expired, but
the firm does not report what happened.
See "Link" above.
See "Link" above.
Number of puts exercised.
Indicator for whether the put exercise described by exenum can be pinpointed to a
single quarter or not. If more than one quarter has the same xexe number, then the
given number of puts was exercised in the these quarters combined. Such quarters are
also marked by yellow shading.
Number of puts settled (before expiration).
Indicator for whether the put settlement described by setnum can be pinpointed to a
single quarter or not. If more than one quarter has the same xset number, then the
given number of puts was settled in the these quarters combined. Such quarters are
also marked by yellow shading.
Cost to the firm from the exercise or settlement.
Indicator for whether the put exercise / settlement cost described by execost can be
pinpointed to a single quarter or not. If more than one quarter has the same xexecost
number, then the given cost applies to these quarters combined. Such quarters are
also marked by yellow shading.
Face value of puts exercised or settled.
Indicator for whether the face value of puts exercised / settled described by exeface
can be pinpointed to a single quarter or not. If more than one quarter has the same
xexeface number, then the given face value applies to these quarters combined. Such
quarters are also marked by yellow shading.
Average strike price of puts exercised / settled.
Lower bound on strike price of puts exercised / settled.
Upper bound on strike price of puts exercised / settled.
Lower bound on exercise / settlement date.
Upper bound on exercise / settlement date.
Indicator for how precisely we know the lower and upper bound exercise / settlement
dates (exedatl and exedath). See above.
Indicator for how precisely we know the lower and upper bound exercise / settlement
dates (exedatl and exedath). See above.
Number of puts expired.
Indicator for whether the put expiration described by expnum can be pinpointed to a
single quarter or not. If more than one quarter has the same xexp number, then the
given number of puts expired in the these quarters combined. Such quarters are also
marked by yellow shading.
Number of puts that had their expiration date extended.
Indicator for whether the put extensions described by extnum can be pinpointed to a
single quarter or not. If more than one quarter has the same xext number, then the
given number of puts was extended in the these quarters combined. Such quarters are
also marked by yellow shading.
Face value of puts that expired or were extended.
Indicator for whether the face value of puts expired / extended described by expface
can be pinpointed to a single quarter or not. If more than one quarter has the same
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expstra
expstrl
expstrh
expdatl
expdath
expld
exphd
callsell
callbuy

xexpface number, then the given face value applies to these quarters combined. Such
quarters are also marked by yellow shading.
Average strike price of puts expired / extended.
Lower bound on strike price of puts expired / extended.
Upper bound on strike price of puts expired / extended.
Lower bound on expiration / extension date.
Upper bound on expiration / extension date.
Indicator for how precisely we know the lower and upper bound expiration / extension
dates (expdatl and expdath). See above.
Indicator for how precisely we know the lower and upper bound expiration / extension
dates (expdatl and expdath). See above.
Indicator for whether the firm sold calls in this quarter (probably incomplete).
Indicator for whether the firm bought calls in this quarter (probably incomplete).
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